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#### Obama will win—key states, electoral votes, Nate Silver, and Intrade.

Lobe 9/8/12—Washington Bureau Chief of the International News Agency Inter Press Service (IPS), JD Berkeley [Jim Lobe, U.S.: Advantage Obama As Election Begins in Earnest, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/u-s-advantage-obama-as-election-begins-in-earnest/>]

Despite persistent high levels of unemployment and some 60 percent of the electorate telling pollsters that the country is headed “in the wrong direction”, most political analysts believe that Obama enters the final 60 days of the race with a leg up over his challenger.

The latest Gallup poll, released just hours after Obama’s acceptance speech Thursday night at the Democratic convention in Charlotte, North Carolina—another key swing state—showed Obama with a 48-45 percent lead over Romney and with a 52-percent overall job approval rating, his highest since June 2011, when he was still basking in the afterglow of the successful U.S. commando raid that killed Al-Qaeda’s chief, Osama bin Laden—an event to which many speakers referred repeatedly during the proceedings.

Gallup suggested in its analysis that Obama appeared likely to benefit from a bigger post-convention “bounce” in the polls than Romney received after the Republican convention in Tampa, Florida, the week before. Indeed, Romney’s “bounce” coming off the convention was virtually non-existent, according to the polls.

Because the president is not elected by the popular vote, however, both political experts and the two campaigns are focused much more on the swing states—those that are considered neither solidly Republican (red) nor Democratic (blue)—that will decide outcome.

Instead of a direct popular vote, the president and vice president are actually elected by an “electoral college” in which each state is allocated a certain number of votes based on their representation in the U.S. Congress.

Almost all states use a “winner-take-all” formula in which whatever candidate wins a majority of the state’s vote receives all of that state’s electoral votes. To win, a candidate must receive a total of at least 271 electoral votes in the electoral college.

Thus, the country’s most populous state, California, has 55 electoral votes all of which will, as appears virtually certain given California’s strongly Democratic electorate, be cast in Obama’s favour. The second-most populous state, Texas, has 38 electoral votes all of which, given the state’s strongly Republican cast, will almost certainly go to Romney.

According to most political analysts, including Republicans, Obama enjoys a significant advantage in the electoral contest.

Current polling shows Romney and his running-mate, Wisconsin Rep. Joe Ryan, with a decisive lead in more states, especially in the Midwest and the Southeast, than Obama and Vice President Joe Biden. But the combined electoral votes of those solidly Republican states come to less than those—including California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Washington State—where the Democratic ticket is considered sure to win.

Different analysts disagree on precisely what constitutes a decisive lead. CNN, for example, currently estimates 237 electoral votes are either solidly in or leaning strongly toward Obama’s column, compared to 191 in Romney’s. Estimates by the Congressional Quarterly a week ago yielded a closer result—201-191.

Analysts likewise disagree on how many toss-up, or swing, states remain. Going into this week’s Democratic convention, CNN named seven states—Florida, Virginia, New Hampshire, Ohio, Iowa, Colorado, and Nevada as true toss-ups. It found four other states—North Carolina, Indiana, Missouri, and Arizona—“leaning” to the Republican ticket, and four more—New Mexico, Wisconsin (despite Ryan’s candidacy), Michigan, and Pennsylvania—“leaning” toward Obama.

If the leaning states fell into their respective columns, Obama would lead Romney by a 247-206 margin and put him within relatively easy striking distance of the magic 271 electoral votes needed to win.

The fact that Obama swept all seven of the remaining toss-up states in 2008 is seen here as making Romney’s task considerably more difficult, particularly given the growing voting strength of Latinos—whose appeals for immigration reform were soundly rebuffed at the Republican convention—in Nevada and Colorado—and concerns among the substantial numbers of retired and elderly voters in Florida about what the Republicans intend to do about the Social Security and Medicare programmes.

In addition, the commitment of former President Bill Clinton—the only living national politician with a 70-percent approval rating whose rousing nomination speech for Obama Thursday fired up the convention in Charlotte and drew rave reviews from all but the most right-wing commentators—to play an active role in the campaign, especially in the industrial swing states, could help shore up support for Obama among white male—especially blue-collar — voters who, of all demographic groups, are seen as most susceptible to Romney’s appeals.

Indeed, those who are actually betting money on the race give Obama much better odder than the polls would suggest. As of Friday, Intrade, the main U.S. on-line betting site, is giving Obama a 59-percent chance of winning, up from a mid-June low of around 54 percent.

The New York Times’ polling guru, Nate Silver, who pays closest attention to state polling, rates Obama’s chances of winning even higher. While Obama will win 51.3 percent of the popular vote Nov 6, Silver estimated Friday, the electoral margin is likely be 313-225 margin. Based on his statistical methods, Silver, the accuracy of whose predictions in the 2008 election persuaded the Times to hire him, is currently estimating Obama’s chances of winning at 77.3 percent.

Of course, all of these predictions could still be upset by a number of intervening factors, such as a sharp rise in unemployment, which is still running at more than eight percent, or a major international crisis, although Obama appears far more eager to inject foreign-policy issues into the campaign than Romney whose failure to praise the U.S. military in his nomination acceptance speech in Tampa was widely criticised, even by fellow-Republicans.

#### More dirty energy production will cost Obama the election—needs green voters to stay mobilized

NOON 4—23—12 executive director for Energy Makes America Great Inc. & the Citizens’ Alliance for Responsible Energy (CARE) [Marita Noon, Environmentalism: Less About Hugging Trees, More About Bringing America To Her Knees, <http://www.westernjournalism.com/environmentalism-less-about-hugging-trees-more-about-bringing-america-to-her-knees-2/>]

Despite his speechmaking touting an “all of the above” energy strategy, President Obama’s reelection could depend on his willingness to stand in the way of developing America’s resources.

Back in November, at the time of the original Keystone XL pipeline decision, environmental groups threatened to pull their backing for Obama if he approved the pipeline. Michael Brune, executive director of America’s largest environmental group, the Sierra Club, is on record as saying that the President’s decision on Keystone would have “a very big impact” on how they funnel their resources—with the obvious implication being that they would not support the President if he didn’t do their bidding.

Other environmental groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund took a different tack but with the same goal. A press release from the Rainforest Action Network promised the President that if he denied Keystone, he would see a “surge of enthusiasm from the green base that supported you so strongly in the last election.”

Environmental groups clearly understand they have the ability to influence the President’s decisions based on their claims to support—or not support—his bid for a second term. So far, they must be pleased with his administration’s efforts. On Wednesday, April 18, leading environmental groups came out with their official endorsement of President Obama—“the earliest” the groups “have ever endorsed in a presidential election cycle.” According to The Hill, “The groups are planning a mix of advertising and on-the-ground work on Obama’s behalf.” However, Glenn Hurowitz, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, thinks the groups should have waited longer before endorsing the President. He believes the early endorsement removes the “greens’ leverage.”

Most pundits agree that the 2012 presidential election will be a hard fought, close race. In order to win, President Obama needs the four million votes from “greens” the groups represent—and they do not want increased domestic resource extraction. According to BusinessWeek, funding from environmental groups is currently less than 50% of what it was through the same period in the 2008 campaign—one of the reasons cited: “renewing offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.”

Though receiving little press, the Obama administration is working hard to convince the “greens” that he is one of them.

#### Extremely contentious – Obama purposely delayed decision until after the election

Rasco 9/17/2012 [Energy Dept delays release of LNG export report. Reuters. /Ayesha Rascoe http://news.yahoo.com/energy-department-delays-release-lng-export-report-211004170--finance.html]

The Obama administration on Monday once again delayed release of a report on expanding liquefied natural gas exports, likely pushing beyond the election a decision on the potentially contentious issue of sending U.S. gas abroad.

Commissioned by the Energy Department to examine the economic impact of LNG exports, the report by an unidentified third-party contractor is now expected to be completed by the end of the year.

Any decision on natural gas exports will likely be made by the victor in the November 6 presidential election - either President Barack Obama or his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney.

The department, which has said it will not make any decision on allowing further LNG exports until the analysis is completed, had previously pledged to release the report by late summer.

"The Department of Energy takes its statutory responsibility to make public interest determinations on natural gas export applications very seriously and is committed to taking the time necessary to get the decisions right," the department said in a statement.

It was the second delay of the report, which was initially expected in March.

"This is a complicated economic analysis assessing a dynamic market," a department official said regarding the postponed report. "We'll release the report once it's complete."

Natural gas exports to all but a handful of countries with Free Trade Agreements with the United States require approval from the department.

After years of projections that the United States would increasingly need to rely on foreign sources for natural gas, advances in drilling techniques have led to a boom in shale gas production that has put the country in a position to export excess gas.

But manufacturers and some lawmakers have raised concerns that exports could increase energy costs at home and undercut U.S. industries.

"For members of Congress seeking reelection, LNG exports may be an issue with two wrong sides," ClearView Energy Partners said in research note on Monday.

Support for exports could leave politicians open to accusations of raising natural gas prices, while opposition could lead to charges of failing to support oil and gas jobs, the research note said.

As a compromise, the Obama administration may be considering capping exports at 6 to 7.4 billion cubic feet initially, ClearView said.

The department has approved exports from just one project so far, Cheniere Energy's Sabine Pass terminal.

After that approval, the Obama administration put LNG export applications from companies such as Dominion Resources and Sempra Energy on hold pending the outcome of the economic analysis.

#### Romney causes massive foreign backlash and nuclear wars around the globe

BANDOW 12 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan [Doug Bandow, 5-15-12, “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism]

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from **promiscuous intervention** in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he **is not qualified to be president**. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

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#### Topical restrictions must be FOR energy production.

#### Energy Production is contextual for each source.

EIA 12—U.S. Energy Information Administration [Online Glossary updated regularly, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=A]

Energy production: See production terms associated with specific energy types.

#### Production in the context of nat gas is drilling.

EIA 12—U.S. Energy Information Administration [Online Glossary updated regularly, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=A]

Production, natural gas: The volume of natural gas withdrawn from reservoirs less (1) the volume returned to such reservoirs in cycling, repressuring of oil reservoirs, and conservation operations; less (2) shrinkage resulting from the removal of lease condensate; and less (3) nonhydrocarbon gases where they occur in sufficient quantity to render the gas unmarketable. Volumes of gas withdrawn from gas storage reservoirs and native gas, which has been transferred to the storage category, are not considered production. Flared and vented gas is also considered production. (This differs from "Marketed Production" which excludes flared and vented gas.)

#### Restrictions are a limitation—they prohibit an action. It excludes terms for acting

#### Restrictions are a limitation that prohibits an action. It excludes terms for acting

COURT OF APPEALS 12 [STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION I, RANDALL KINCHELOE Appellant. vs. Respondent, BRIEF OF APPELLANT, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/a01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe's.pdf]

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put.

The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as;

To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

#### ON indicates the object of the action

American Heritage 2k [The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000]

Used to indicate the object affected by actual, perceptible action: The spotlight fell on the actress. He knocked on the door.

b. Used to indicate the object affected by a figurative action: Have pity on them.

c. Used to indicate the object of an action directed, tending, or moving against it: an attack on the fortress.

d. Used to indicate the object of perception or thought: gazed on the vista; meditated on his actions.

#### Violation – the aff reduces a supervising term – not a restriction. Restrictions prohibit.

#### VOTE NEG

#### LIMITS – the number of supervising terms is limitless - each one becomes an aff.

#### CORE GROUND – only ensured links are to energy production – restrictions mean they don’t have to produce more, just make it easier to obtain access.

### 1NC K

#### Energy production discourse traps us in a democratic-authoritarian bargain. Promises of increased supply defer ethical and ecological responsibility to technological expertise.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 1-3]

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss ,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings-almost one-third of the planet's population-experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact-and sometimes exacerbated-social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smi l, 2003: 370- 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who ' early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner too c heap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, ctted tn the New York Ttmes 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the "magical fire" or the prolifera~ ion of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize "inherently safe reactors" (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in "sustainable energy alternatives" that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, "green" energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy "haves" and "havenots." 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291 ), "today's nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people" as "micropower meets village power." Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a "solar global economy ... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world's cultural diversity" (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (I 934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ... an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations ... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity-here are the enemies. The living organism demands ali fe-sustaining environment. Modernity's formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity's supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era's social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the "democratic authoritarian bargain" ( 1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce "every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority" on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford's work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### The supply-side energy regime produces chronic failure. Energy becomes an end-in-itself with no social or ethical guidance.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 20-21] **[Gender paraphrased]**

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133- 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy's social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the "great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise." Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford ( 1964). Governance "by the people" consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests ( 1964: I) that the classical idea of democracy includes "a group of related ideas and practices ... [including] communal self-government ... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community." Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which "deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over [hu]man[ity] himself, the chief purpose of existence" (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

#### Technocratic management makes extinction inevitable—no aff proposal can solve.

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### We must begin with a social critique and analysis of the modern energy regime. Ethical criticism of the existing energy regime cultivates alternatives to technocratic consumption.

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'Dissident' is perhaps a better and more accurate term to apply to greens than 'revolutionary', since while both share an opposition to the prevailing social order, revolutionary is clearly more antagonistic rather than agonistic, to use the terms indicated in chapter 7. Dissidents seek to direct a self transforming present in a more radical direction, whereas revolutionaries typically seek the complete destruction of the existing order and then the construction of a new one. Greens as dissidents also begin from an acceptance of the inevitability of key aspects of this transition-primarily around climate change and the end of the oil age-and thus see an answer to 'what is to be done?' in terms of managing and shaping that inevitable transition, rather than building/re-building. Dissident also seems less extreme and dogmatic in its critique and its demands, than those who advocate full-blown revolution. And given what was said in chapter 3 and elsewhere about the link between creativity, flexibility, and adaptive fitness, it would be odd for green politics to be dogmatic revolutionaries animated by a sense of the hopelessness of working within and through contemporary institutiohs or that there was nothing worth preserving within and from the contemporary social order. Green dissent could perhaps be (wrongly) described as somewhere on a continuum between 'reformism' and 'revolution', a form of 'creative adaptive management' to create collective resilience in the face of actually existing unsustainability.1 In his essay 'The Power of the Powerless', Vaclav Havel uses the story of a greengrocer who unthinkingly displays his 'loyalty' to the regime by displaying a Communist Party slogan in his shop. This the greengrocer does 'ritualistically, since this is the only way the regime is capable of acknowledging his display of loyalty' (Havel, 1978: 45). In a similar way, being a dutiful consumer and not questioning economic growth could also perhaps be regarded as the way in which loyalty to a dominant capitalist, consumer regime is ritualistically displayed, enacted, and affirmed. It is for this reason, if not only this reason, that one completely misunderstands consumerism, consumption, and being a 'consumer', if one views it solely individualistically as some economic-cum-metabolic act. As a public display of loyalty, consuming is first and foremost a collective act, an individual joining others in a shared activity and associated identity. So while critics such as Fromm are correct in highlighting the distinction in consumer culture between 'being' and 'having' (Fromm, 1976), what these analyses often miss is that consumption is also an act of' belonging' and identity affirmation (Keat, 1994; Jackson, 2009b).It is for this reason that a refusal to consume is so damaging to the modern political and economic order and why to consciously choose not to consume is perhaps one of the most politically significant acts one can do in a consumer society. And one that, the continual performance (or rather non-performance) of which, further marks one out as a dissident, part of 'the great refusal' to use Marcuse's term (Marcuse, 1964). That is, to question economic growth under consumer capitalism is to be 'disloyal' to the prevailing order. While for Havel living in what he calls the 'post-totalitarian' communist regime is 'living a lie', I do not want to go so far and say that life in contemporary consumer capitalist democracies is in the same way to 'live a lie'. Rather what I would like to dwell upon is Havel's notion of'living within the truth' and what this can offer for green dissidents. For Havel 'living within the truth ... can be any means by which a person or group revolts against manipulation: anything from a letter by intellectuals to a workers' strike, from a rock concert to a student demonstration, from refusing to vote in the farcical elections, to making an open speech at some official congress, or even a hunger strike' (Havel, 1986: 59-60). Though clearly written with the then communist regime in mind, Havel's call to 'live in truth' is equally pertinent to consumer capitalism. As he puts it: The profound crisis of human identity brought on by living within a lie, a crisis which in turn makes such a life possible, certainly possesses a moral dimension as well; it appears, among other things, as a deep moral crisis in society. A person who has been seduced by the consumer value system, whose identity is dissolved in an amalgam of the accoutrements of mass civilization, and who has not roots in the order of being, no sense of responsibility for anything higher than his or her own personal survival, is a demoralized person. The system depends on this demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it into society. (Havel, 1978: 62; emphasis added) Silence is of course a consequence and precondition for this demoralization, and what power requires under consumer capitalism is passive and silent acquiescence as much as active participation. For Havel the re-appropriation of individual responsibility is something to be actively striven for. This reverses or balances the usual focus on rights and freedoms with which often 'progressive' critiques of consumerism are couched. In Havel's response to what Tim Jackson amongst others has called 'The Age of Irresponsibility' (Jackson, 2009b ), also connects with some of the green republican arguments outlined in chapters 6 and 7, not least the stress on both the recovery of the good of politics and the centrality of the individual citizen as a moral being and not just or only a consumer (or producer/worker or investor). As Jackson notes, 'the "age of irresponsibility" is not about casual oversight or individual greed. The economic crisis is not a consequence of isolated malpractice in selected parts of the banking sector. If there has been irresponsibility, it has been much more systemic, sanctioned from the top, and with one clear aim in mind: the continuation and protection of economic growth' (Jackson, 2009b: 26; emphasis added). The struggle Havel describes from the 1968 'Prague Spring' between 'the system' and 'the aims of life' (Havel, 1978: 66) resonate green concerns of the degradation of natural life-supporting systems and the undermining of conditions promoting human conviviality, quality of life, and well-being (Barry, 2009b; De Geus, 2009, 2003; Jackson, 2009a). What Havel goes on to say about political change and strategy in the context of a consumer culture is pertinent and important for those seeking a transition away from unsustainability, 'Society is not sharply polarized on the level of actual political power, but ... the fundamental lines of conflict run right through each person' (Havel, 1978: 91; emphasis added). This is a profound point, namely that it is difficult, if not impossible, to simply analyse actually existing unsustainability as an oppressive totalitarian regime in which there is an identifiable 'them' dominating 'us'. Under consumer capitalism, debt-based consumption, and so on, we who live in these societies are all implicated in its continuation. And while of course there are identifiable groups and institutions (such as large corporations, financial wealth management firms, the leadership of mainstream political parties, key agencies of the nation state such as departments of finance, global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMP, and what Sklair has called the 'transnational capitalist class') who do benefit more from actually existing unsustainability, we have to face up to the fact that 'ordinary people', that is, everyone also contributes (unequally of course) to the 'mundane' operation of global capitalism and the exploitation of people and planet. The recognition of this is but another way of drawing attention to the fact that capitalism, the common sense of neoclassical economics, and so on have achieved 'full spectrum' domination of hearts and minds, such that capitalism, and realistic critiques of it, need to be viewed as cultural (and indeed psychological) projects. It is for this reason that I canvassed the Transition movement in chapter 3, since it adopts an explicitly cultural and psychological approach. Of course such cultural and psychological critical analyses are not exhausted by this movement and these cannot be a substitute for oppositional political struggle. This 'cultural turn' in green politics is, to my mind, linked to the 'postscarcity economics of sustainable desire' outlined in chapter 5, and is premised firmly on a notion of human flourishing that lies beyond production, 'supplyside' solutions, 'competiveness', and increasing 'labour productivity'. This notion of flourishing is not anti-materialist. Let me make that abundantly clear, it is not an ascetic renunciation of materialism for its own sake, as if material life is intrinsically unworthy or does not express valued modes of human being. Thus I do not accept the Fromm-inspired view that materialism or indeed material consumption is simply a mode of 'having' and not 'being'. After all, the critique should be directed at consumerism and overconsumption, not materialism or consumption per se. At a basic level one can see how communism and consumerism are two 'regimes of truth' -to return to the Foucauldian language used in chapter 4 imposing their version of the truth, exacting payment, compliance, and subjectivity from their client populations, quelling, distracting, and undermining dissidents, and using different but also some shared techniques to continue. And the appropriate dissident, progressive attitude, and strategy against both is, for Havel, ultimately an ethical one, an ethical and political life-affirming 'reconstitution of society' (Havel, 1978: 115). That Havel conceives consumer-capitalist and communist societies as comparable can be seen in his view that: traditional parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the autonomism of technological civilization, and the industrial-consumer society, for they, too, are being dragged helplessly along by it. People are manipulated in ways that are infinitely more subtle and refined than the brutal methods used in the post-totalitarian societies ... the omnipresent dictatorship of consumption, production, advertising, commerce, consumer culture, and all that flood of information. (Havel, 1978: 116; emphasis added) Some of the republican elements expressed in Havel's thought centre around 'responsibility' (Havel, 1986: 104). He maintains that the abdication of responsibility in the name of consumer choice-what I have elsewhere described as the reduction of political liberty to a consumer 'freedom of choice' (Barry, 2009a)-weakens the ethical and political capacities of citizens within liberal democracies. Liberal consumer-citizens then become 'victims of the same autonomism, and are incapable of transcending concerns about their own personal survival to become proud and responsible members of the polis, making a genuine contribution to the creation of its destiny' (Havel, 1978: 116; emphasis added). In this Havel is articulating concerns very close to the type of green republicanism outlined in this book. His concluding comments in The Power of the Powerless also offer suggestive lines for interpreting the Transition movement. In a passage focusing on the contours of what Havel calls the 'existential revolution' that is needed to renew the relationship of humans to the 'human order and cosmopolitan responsibility', Havel notes that the structures needed to make this happen 'should naturally arise from below as a consequence of authentic "selforganization"; they should derive energy from a living dialogue with the genuine needs from which they arise, and when these needs are gone, the structures should also disappear ... The decisive criterion of this "selfconstitution" should be the structure's actual significance and not just a mere abstract norm' (Havel, 1978: 119). A better description of the Transition movement's aims, motivations, and objectives would be hard to find. Havel goes on to describe these new, provisional, and practical structures 'postdemocratic'. He describes the outlines of these 'authentic' political structures in this manner: Do not these groups emerge, live, and disappear under pressure from concrete and authentic needs, unburdened by the ballast of hollow traditions? Is not their attempt to create an articulate form of 'living within the truth' and to renew the feeling of higher responsibility in an apathetic society really a sign of some rudimentary moral reconstitution? In other words, are riot these informed, non-bureaucratic dynamic and open communities that comprise the 'parallel polis' a kind of rudimentary prefiguration, a symbolic model of those more meaningful 'post-democratic' political structures that might become the foundation of a better society? (Havel, 1978: 120-121). Fundamental here, I think, is Havel's call to responsibility and struggle against the prevailing political order when it undermines quality of life, perpetuates injustice, or the denial or compromising of democratic norms. In a similar vein Carla Emery puts it eloquently, 'People have to choose what they're going to struggle for. Life is always a struggle, whether or not you're struggling for anything worthwhile, so it might as well be for something worthwhile' (in Astyk, 2008: 204). Or to phrase it differently: get busy living or get busy dying. WHAT IF WE ARE THE PEOPLE WE'VE BEEN WAITING FOR? 289 As argued throughout this book in facing the many challenges of the present time-climate change, peak oil, diminishing forms of social well-being, financial and economic crises, and the ecological liquidation of the foundations of life on the planet-the most important response needed is one which explicitly focuses on imagination and creativity. As W. B. Yeats (long before Barak Obama used a version of these sentiments) suggested, what is needed is for us 'to seek a remedy ... in audacity of speculation and creation' (Yeats, 1926). While 'another world is possible' it can only be possible if it is imagined, and perhaps one of the most persistent obstacles to the transition away from actually existing unsustainability apart from ignorance of the ecological and human costs of our capitalist-consumer way of life-is the stultifying grip of 'business as usual' and its limited and limiting horizons of possible futures for ourselves and our societies. In many respects, our collective inability to respond to 'limits to growth' is in large measure due to limits of creativity and imagination. We cannot, or find it very difficult, to imagine a different social order. For Richard Norgaard the answer to our present ecological predicament is as difficult to achieve as it is simple to express, 'We need a new life story. We need an overarching story that respects a diversity of life stories. Living the story of economic development is destroying humanity and nature and a good many other species along with us. We need a master story that puts our hope, compassion, brains, sociality, and diversity to new and constructive ends' (in Deb, 2009: xxiii). And if we follow Havel, it may be that this new story we need is already here, in the same sense that the eco-feminist Mary Mellor (Mellor, 1995) has persuasively written that the sustainable world, society, or mode of being is not some utopian 'there' but an already living, embodied, engendered 'here' in the reproductive and exploited labour of women, in the 'core' economic activity of caring and sharing and ... flourishing. The Polanyi-inspired attempt to 'reembed' the economy within human social relations can be viewed as a defensive move to protect community from both the formal market and the state. Such protective measures can include the expansion of the social economy, or the efforts by the Transition movement in seeking to disrupt, slow down and re-conceptualize the economy. Such reactive measures could all be thought of as seeking to defend and extend those sustainable practices in the here and now, that is, that already exist within 'actually existing unsustainability'. This is particularly the case with reproductive labour as outlined in this book. Actually it is the neoclassical economic view that is 'utopian' in promoting a fictitious and dangerous imaginary of human life lived at 365/24/7 speed and a way of life completely out of synch not just with human biological but also ecological time. And, it must be recalled, 'Mother Nature does not do bailouts'. As Havel suggests, 'For the real question is whether the "brighter future" is really always so distant. What if, on the contrary, it has been here for a long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from developing it?' (Havel, 1978: 122). Now there's an intriguing set of concluding thoughts-what if not only the resilient, sustainable way of life is 'always already here', present, and available to us if we so choose-but also if it is indeed the case that 'we are the people we've been waiting for?' And what of the hard greens, where do they and their analysis fit within this book? For it is fair to say that they have been shadowing the book. While I discussed them briefly in the Introduction and made some casual comments about them and their diverse positions and prescriptions throughout, I have not met them head on as it were. So it would be fitting for me to offer my thoughts on the place and status of the hard green position. Are they basically correct? Do I agree with them (from the green republican acceptance of the time-bound and contingent character of all human creations, including civilizations and societies) that they have identified the beginning of the end of our existing capitalist, carbon-based civilization and societies? While I certainly admire their brutal honesty, I baulk at their jump from crisis to collapse, and then from collapse to violence and 'de-civilization' (Elias, 2000; Hine and Kingsnorth, 2010). Their political analyses echo (almost always unwittingly) the eco-authoritarian position of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The hard-green view in being so pessimistic means its pessimism precludes a view of politics as the 'art of the possible', and a view of the inevitability of collapse can and does lead to de-politicized or even anti-political responses. But surely the challenge, as outlined by the green republican project of this book, is to embrace new intelligibilities, ways of being, having, and doing, new identities and subjectivities, and new arts of life, all must be part of a project to avert collapse?2 This is, as I see it, the point of green republican politics as a form of 'anticipatory politics' to challenge the rule of the 'nee-liberal vulgate'. At this present moment, on the cusp of this 'Great Transition', what greens need is to cultivate critical awareness, opposition, and dissent, to have the courage of their convictions in analysing and resisting actually existing unsustainability, and outlining their vision for the transition to a better society, in part to engage, inform, and prepare citizens for the coming changes that will characterize the decades ahead. Greens need to be realistic and cleareyed in their disavowal of naive utopianism, but convinced of its basic conviction that another world is possible, necessary, and desirable. And while on quiet mornings we may hear it coming, its arrival, like all major transitions in human history, will demand political struggle. The battle for hearts, minds, and hands has begun, and my writing this book and you reading it are constitutive of that struggle.

### 1NC—Warming

#### 1. Natgas is a bridge to nowhere.

**Romm 12—**Senior Fellow @ American Progress [Dr. [Joe Romm](http://thinkprogress.org/author/joe/) (Ph.D. in physics from MIT), “[Natural Gas Is A Bridge To Nowhere — Absent a Serious Price for Global Warming Pollution](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/24/407765/natural-gas-is-a-bridge-to-nowhere-price-for-global-warming-pollution/),” Think Progress, Jan 24, 2012 at 2:30 pm, Pg. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/24/407765/natural-gas-is-a-bridge-to-nowhere-price-for-global-warming-pollution/]

Building lots of new gas plants doesn’t make much sense since we need to sharply reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the next few decades if we’re to have any chance to avoid catastrophic global warming. We don’t want new gas plants to displace new renewables, like solar and wind, which are going to be the  some of the biggest, sustainable job creating industries of the century.

Late last year, some of the leading (center-right) economists in the country — Nicholas Z. Muller, Robert Mendelsohn, and William Nordhaus — concluded in a top economic journal that [the total damages from natural gas generation exceed its value-added at a low-ball carbon price of $27 per ton](http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/10/13/332882/economics-coal-fired-power-plants-air-pollution-damages/)! At a price of $65 a ton of carbon, the total damages from natural gas are more than double its value-added!

For the record, stabilizing at 550 ppm atmospheric concentrations of CO2, which would likely still be catastrophic for humanity, would require a price of $330 a metric ton of carbon in 2030, the International Energy Agency (IEA) [noted back in 2008.](http://www.grist.org/article/six-degrees-of-preparation)

The fact that natural gas is a bridge fuel to nowhere was in fact, first demonstrated by the IEA in its big June 2011 report on gas — see [I](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/24/407765/romm/2011/06/07/238578/iea-golden-age-of-natural-gas-scenario-warming-climate-change/)[EA’s “Golden Age of Gas Scenario” Leads to More Than 6°F Warming and Out-of-Control Climate Change](http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/06/07/238578/iea-golden-age-of-natural-gas-scenario-warming-climate-change/).  That study — which had both coal and oil consumption peaking in 2020 — made abundantly clear that if we want to avoid catastrophic warming, we need to start getting off of all fossil fuels.

Then came a remarkable [new study](http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/09/09/315845/natural-gas-switching-from-coal-to-gas-increases-warming-for-decades/) by Tom Wigley of the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) that concluded:

In summary, our results show that the substitution of gas for coal as an energy source results in increased rather than decreased global warming for many decades.

“Relying more on natural gas would reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, but it would do little to help solve the climate problem,” says Wigley, who is also an adjunct professor at the University of Adelaide in Australia. “It would be many decades before it would slow down global warming at all, and even then it would just be making a difference around the edges.”

Natural gas might have been a “bridge” to a low-carbon future 30 years ago when the term was first introduced, but now its primary value would be to reduce the cost of meeting a near-term CO2 target in the U.S. in the context of a rising CO2 price.

#### 2. Fugitive methane emissions increases warming

**Chameides 7/20**/12—Professor of the Environment Earth & Ocean Sciences @ Duke University [[Bill Chameides](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides) (Fellow of the American Geophysical Union and Chief scientist @ Environmental Defense.), “Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon Future or Not?,” Huffington Post, Posted: 07/20/2012 5:22 pm, pg. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides/-natural-gas-a-bridge-to\_b\_1690857.html

Chapter 2. Climate Threatened by Sinister Methane Leakage

Interestingly enough, with the advent of fracking for shale gas and the consequent jump in estimates of natural gas resources (see [here](http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110824134238.htm) and [here](http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/)), the use of natural gas as a transition fuel actually seems to be feasible. Good news for the climate, one might conclude.

Not really, scientists like Bob Howarth of Cornell University, protested. Why? Before answering that, you need to know a couple of background facts. First, methane, the major component of natural gas, is itself a very potent greenhouse gas -- some 21 times more effective a warmer than CO2 on a 100-year basis. And second, when we use natural gas, there are inevitably fugitive emissions, leaks during mining, transport, and consumption that allow methane to escape into the atmosphere where it can do its global warming thing. What Howarth argued in a [much-debated paper](http://www.springer.com/about+springer/media/springer+select?SGWID=0-11001-6-1128722-0) published last year is that the leakage rates are so high that, contrary to conventional wisdom, transitioning from coal to natural gas would actually lead to more global warming than just sticking with coal, even though coal is the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels.

Since the paper's publication, other investigators and studies have weighed in on the matter, including RealClimate's [Gavin Smith](http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2011/04/fracking-methane/); the Council on Foreign Relations' [Michael Levi](http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/04/15/some-thoughts-on-the-howarth-shale-gas-paper/); [Ramón Alvarez](http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/04/02/1202407109.full.pdf+html) of Environmental Defense Fund and co-authors; and another Cornell scientist, [Lawrence Cathles](http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/a-fresh-scientific-defense-of-the-merits-of-moving-from-coal-to-shale-gas/). But a definitive conclusion has been elusive because the actual magnitude of these fugitive emissions remains very poorly defined.

Chapter 3. Methane Leakage Exonerated?

The upshot of the debate about the importance of fugitive emissions has led to a general consensus that we need a very thorough investigation into the leakage issue. In short we need to first pin down the magnitude of fugitive emissions and then cut them down by locking the methane up. (See [here](http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/04/02/1202407109.abstract) and [here](http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/thegreengrok/frackingworkshop).)

But now Cornell's Cathles argues in a [new paper](http://bit.ly/NiAsaG) published last week in the journal Geochemistry Geophysics Geosystems that fugitive emissions may not be that sinister after all. Or at least not if natural gas is indeed used as a bridge fuel that is first phased in as coal and some oil are phased out and then eventually is itself phased out in favor of carbon-free energy sources.

Assuming periods of 50, 100, and 200 years to make the transition from coal to natural gas to renewables, Cathles's model calculations indicate that the long-term (i.e., multiple decades to century timescales) climate impacts of the fugitive methane emissions are relatively small. The reason is that methane has a relatively short lifetime in the atmosphere -- [about 12 years](http://epa.gov/methane/scientific.html). And so once natural gas is no longer used as a fuel, the methane in the atmosphere from fugitive emissions will be removed from the atmosphere and so the warming from those emissions will be essentially gone. CO2 on the other hand is long-lived and so, Cathles argues, over the long term using natural gas instead of coal or oil is preferable because less CO2 will have been emitted in that scenario. Well, it is preferable provided we use natural gas as a transition fuel that eventually gives way to even cleaner renewables and/or nuclear. And then there's the issue of the short-term climate effects from fugitive emissions.

Chapter 4. The Question of the Short Term

Cathles's point about the transient effects of methane fugitive emissions is well taken. But there is a potential catch and it relates to short-term climate effects. During the transition period, when fugitive methane from using natural gas would build up in the atmosphere, there is a possibility, depending upon the magnitude of the methane emissions, that we would experience more short-term warming than if we were to have stuck with coal and oil. We might think of this as the transient version of the Howarth argument.

Now, as long as the fugitive emissions are small or the Earth system is "reversible," the transient Howarth scenario does not seem all that worrisome. But what if the emissions are large? And what if the disturbances from global warming are not reversible? Then we would have a problem. The transition to natural gas would lead to more warming for a period of time until natural gas is phased out and the excess methane is removed from the atmosphere. With the exit of the excess methane, the extra warming would also go away. Cathles seems to argue that all would be well:

"Even when methane leakage is so large (L = 10% of consumption) that substituting gas for coal and oil increases global warming in the short term, the benefit of gas substitution returns in the long term."

But it is not all that obvious that the impacts from global warming are reversible. If fragile ecosystems like coral reefs are decimated by a decade or two of extra methane-induced warming, can we be sure that they will recover once the methane is flushed from the atmosphere? Probably not.

Now for this to be a concern, fugitive emissions would need to be large -- about 10 percent or more. That's' a very remote possibility. Even so, Cathles's interesting results notwithstanding, I don't think we can ignore fugitive emissions and just assume they're too small to care about. And in any event from an economic and environmental point of view, the less of that stuff the better.

Epilogue

Cathles would agree. In fact he concludes his paper with the policy recommendation that leakage of methane related to natural gas production, transport, and use be reduced to about 1 percent. Let's call it the one-percent solution.

#### Warming is slowing because of sulfur aerosols.

[Louise Gray](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/louise-gray/), 11/26/2010. Environment Correspondent for the Telegraph. “Global warming has slowed because of pollution,” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8159991/Global-warming-has-slowed-because-of-pollution.html.

The latest figures from more than 20 scientific institutions around the world show that global temperatures are higher than ever. ¶ However the gradual rise in temperatures over the last 30 years is slowing slightly. Global warming since the 1970s has been 0.16C (0.3F) but the rise in the last decade was just 0.05C (0.09F), according to the Met Office. ¶ Sceptics claim this as evidence man made global warming is a myth. ¶ But in a new report the Met Office said the reduced rate of warming can be easily explained by a number of factors. And indeed the true rate of warming caused by man made greenhouse gases could be greater than ever. ¶ One of the major factors is pollution over Asia, where the huge growth in coal-fired power stations mean aerosols like sulphur are being pumped into the air. This reflects sunlight, cooling the land surface temperature. ¶ Dr Vicky Pope, Head of Climate Change Advice, said pollution may be causing a cooling effect. ¶ “A possible increase in aerosol emissions from Asia in the last decade may have contributed to substantially to the recent slowdown,” she said. “Aerosols cool the climate by reflecting the sunlight.”

#### Reducing coal emissions would trigger rapid warming due to reduced aerosol cooling.

N. Chalmers et al, 1,2 E. J. Highwood,1 E. Hawkins,1,2 R. Sutton,1,2 L. J. Wilcox1, 8/21/2012. 1Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, Reading, U.K.; 2NCAS-Climate, University of Reading, Reading, U.K. “Aerosol contribution to the rapid warming of 2 near-term climate under RCP 2.6,” Manuscript, accepted for publication in Geophysical Research Letters, www.met.reading.ac.uk/~ed/home/chalmers\_etal\_2012\_accepted.pdf.

\*\*\*RCP="Representative Concentration Pathways." These are IPCC scenarios designed for use in climate models, that essentially project different scenarios for changes (or lack thereof) in global emissions. RCP2.6 is a scenario of significant emissions reductions. RCP4.5 is the baseline "business as usual" scenario.

\*\*\*CDNC=cloud droplet number concentration

The period during which global mean surface temperature in RCP2.6 is higher than in 130 RCP4.5, discussed in the previous section, is directly related to a rapid increase in global 131 mean surface temperature in RCP2.6, between around 2010 and around 2025 (Figure 1a). 132 In this section we investigate the causes of this rapid warming, and relate this event to 133 the comparison with RCP4.5. Figure 3 shows maps of the differences between the 10 year 134 means before and after the rapid warming. In this case a positive value indicates a larger 135 value after the sudden warming identified in Figure 1.¶ 136 As expected, there is a large reduction in sulphate load, and corresponding decrease 137 in CDNC over most of the northern hemisphere, consistent with a change in the indirect 138 aerosol effect. An increase in the effective radius is also seen (not shown). This reduces 139 the optical depth of the clouds when they are present, meaning more downward shortwave 140 flux is transmitted to the surface. There is also a prominent decrease in cloud fraction over 141 the subtropical northeastern Pacific Ocean which could be a consequence of the impact 142 of reduced sulphate aerosol on cloud lifetime. Lu et al. [2009] show that drizzle rate from 143 clouds in this region is indeed inversely related to aerosol concentration. Kloster et al. 144 [2010] also suggested that a change in cloud water path in their simulations with aggres-¶ 145 sive aerosol reductions resulted from enhanced drizzle formation. We hypothesise that 146 the localised nature of this feature by comparison with the sulphate and CDNC change 147 is due to the cloud in this region being particularly sensitive to a change in aerosol. Cli- 148 matologically, this region is a transition zone between open and closed mesoscale cellular 149 convection [Rosenfeld et al., 2011], aerosol concentrations being lower in the open celled 150 regions [Woods et al., 2011]. Although the details of these processes are unlikely to be 151 represented explicitly in global models, the localised strong decrease in cloud fraction in 152 the northeastern Pacific ocean would be consistent with a change in cloud regime driven 153 by decreased aerosol. Other regions show increases in cloud fraction, which cannot readily 154 be explained as a direct response to the decrease in sulphate load. It is likely that instead 155 these reflect non-local adjustments of the coupled ocean-atmosphere system in response 156 to the change in forcing.¶ 157 Figure 3 also shows the difference in surface shortwave flux (panel d), surface air tem- 158 perature (panel e), and global energy balance (panel f). The predicted increase in surface 159 downward shortwave radiation is seen in the global mean and particularly in the regions 160 of decreased cloud fraction and sulphate load. A negative anomaly in surface SW is co- 161 located with the positive cloud fraction changes. The pattern of surface air temperature 162 change shows large warming over the northern continents and the Arctic, and also a local 163 maximum over the subtropical northeastern Pacific coincident with the region of reduced 164 cloud fraction. The same localised pattern appears in all the simulations of Kloster et al. 165 [2010] that include aerosol reductions, but is absent from their simulations considering 166 only future changes in greenhouse gases.¶ 167 The surface energy budget shows the expected increases in downward shortwave radia- 168 tion. In addition there is an increase in downward longwave radiation in response to the 169 increase in GHG concentrations between the two periods, and also reflecting changes in 170 clouds. The warming due to increases in net surface downward radiation is balanced by 171 increases in latent and (over land) sensible heat fluxes.¶ 4. Discussion and Conclusions¶ 172 In this study we have compared projections of near term climate in the HadGEM2-ES 173 model under RCP4.5 and RCP2.6. GHG forcing under these scenarios is almost identical 174 until 2020, and then declines in RCP2.6 relative to RCP4.5. However, between 2018 and 175 2037 global annual mean surface air temperature is warmer under RCP2.6. The start of 176 this period **is characterised by a period of particularly rapid warming**.¶ 177 Our results provide compelling evidence that the warming in RCP2.6 is a result of a 178 rapid decrease in sulphate aerosol load. This decrease is caused by a decrease in sulphur 179 emissions in RCP2.6, **as a result of the rapid decrease in coal use** needed to reduce GHG 180 emissions. Thus our results highlight the difficulty of reducing the rate of global warming 181 in the near term in this model, even under extreme scenarios for reducing GHG emissions, 182 and is consistent with previous simulations by Wigley [1991] and Johns et al. [2011].

#### Natural gas emits less CO2 than coal, but is net worse for warming because it also emits less SO2—replacing coal or oil with natural gas will significantly accelerate warming.

V. Ramanathan\* and Y. Feng, 9/23/2008. Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California at San Diego. “On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system: Formidable challenges ahead,” PNAS 105.38, 14245-14250, www.pnas.org/content/105/38/14245.full.pdf.

Currently coal, oil, and natural gas contribute 41%, 39%, and 20%, respectively, to the fossil fuel CO2 emission (19). If we just compare CO2 emissions per joule of energy released, natural gas is the cleanest fuel among fossil fuels: coal emits 􏲏25 kg C/GJ (kg of carbon per giga joule of energy), oil emits 􏲏20 kg C/GJ, and natural gas emits 􏲏15 kg C/GJ. Fossil fuel contributes 􏲏80% of the total CO2 emission, and other CO2 emissions include cement production (2%) and land-use changes (18%) (22). Weighting the percent contribution of each fuel to total CO2 emission with the CO2 climate forcing (as of 2005), we obtain the following: coal, oil, and natu- ral gas contributed 􏲏18%, 17%, and 9%, respectively to the committed warming of 2.4°C. The rest of the com- mitted warming is from CO2 emission caused by cement production and land- use changes (11%) and from emission of other GHGs (45%) (11). On the other hand, viewed in terms of surface warming, coal and oil are also the major sources of SO2 emissions (the precursor for sulfate aerosols in ABCs) as they are responsible for 55% and 25% of global SO2 emissions and natural gas 1% (year 2002). Sulfate aerosols con- tribute 70% of the 47% masking effect by ABCs (18). **When we factor in the sulfate masking effect, gas is likely the strongest global warming fossil fuel**. It should be pointed out, however, that coal and oil only look favorable if their associated SO2 emissions are allowed to continue unabated. With respect to oil, however, diesel is a major source of black carbon, and when this is factored in, oil may emerge as the strongest global-warming agent (23). The above estimates illustrate the significance of the GHG–air pollution interactions in deter- mining the actual warming potential of fuels. The GHG–SO2 coupling illustrated above is consistent with a more quantitative modeling study (24). This study showed that when fossil fuel related CO2 emission is considered along with fossil fuel-related SO2 emission, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries emerged as the ‘‘dominant contributor’’ to recent global warming, because of their great success in reducing SO2 emissions (see Fig. 3 and refs. 25–32). Switching from coal to ‘‘cleaner’’ natural gas will reduce CO2 emission and thus would be effective in minimizing future increases in the committed warming. However, because it also reduces air pollution and thus the ABC masking effect, it may speed up the approach to the committed warming of 2.4°C (1.4– 4.3°C). We are not arguing in favor of more coal combustion (a major contributor to ABCs) but simply point out that **increasing natural gas consumption** by 70% from 2005 to 2030 as projected now by the International Energy Agency (19) **without an overall reduction in fossil fuel consumption could significantly accelerate the warming**. The large warming experienced since the 1970s may, in part, be caused by the dramatic (160%) increases in consumption of natural gas from 1970 to 2005. The other likely contributor is the decrease in SO2 emissions from a peak of 75 Mton (million tons) of sulfur in early 1970s to 62 Mton of sulfur by 2003.

#### That would double warming and quickly take us above the “2-degree threshold.”

Dr Andrew Glikson, 6/6/2011. Earth and paleoclimate science, Australian National University. “Global warming above 2° so far mitigated by accidental geo-engineering,” Crikey, http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/06/06/global-warming-above-2%C2%B0-so-far-mitigated-by-accidental-geo-engineering/.

According to NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Science climate reports, global warming is already committed to a rise above two degrees. The magical two degrees ceiling determined by governments **is only holding thanks to effective, if unintended, geo-engineering by sulphur dioxide** emitted from industry, holding global warming to about half of what it would be otherwise. Recent publications by Hansen and his [research](http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejeh1/mailings/2011/20110415_EnergyImbalancePaper.pdf) [group](http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1105/1105.0968.pdf) indicate the rise of atmospheric energy (heat) level due to greenhouse gases and land clearing are committed to +2.3 degrees (+3.1 Watt/m2), currently mitigated by the transient effect of sulphur aerosols and the cooling effect of the oceans. Sulphur dioxide is emanated from coal, oil and the processing of minerals (breakdown of sulphides to produce copper, zinc, lead and so on), and from other chemical industries. It combines with water in the atmosphere to produce sulphuric acid, which (being heavier than air) condenses and settles to the ground within a few years. Aerosols stay in the atmosphere and stratosphere on time scales ranging from hours to days and to years, depending on their grain size, chemistry and height in the atmosphere and on the physical state and temperature of the atmosphere at different altitudes and latitudes. The aerosols are short-lived, i.e. on time scales of up to a few years, but since they are continuously emitted from industry the overall level is increasing as burning of fossil fuels is rising. The continuing emission of sulphur aerosols in effect constitute a global geo-engineering process without which the atmosphere would warm by another 1.2 degrees (1.6 Watt/m2) above the present level, **resulting in near-doubling of global warming** ([Figure 1](http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejeh1/mailings/2011/20110415_EnergyImbalancePaper.pdf)).

### 1NC—Russia

#### 1. US will not increase LNG imports—The have to win that the US becomes a net gas importer to access this advantage. This not even a remote possibility once you consider the tremendous amount of gas in our storage facilities

#### 2. European fracking will reduce Russia’s leverage

**Blas 12**—Commodities Editor [Javier Blas, “Russia faces challenge to gas supremacy,” Financial Times, Last updated: April 17, 2012 3:25 pm, pg. http://tinyurl.com/97e36nr

The biggest risk for Russia is not the US shale gas but the potential of the development of similar reserves in neighbouring Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Ukraine.

Eastern European countries are racing to tap shale deposits using the same technology—hydraulic fracturing, known as fracking, and horizontal drilling—used in the US gas industry.

Gazprom supplies Europe with about 20 per cent of its gas needs, so the development of shale deposits in its backyard is a serious long-term threat.

Until now, European companies have found it difficult to renegotiate their expensive contracts with Gazprom because the lack of alternative suppliers. Over the next decade, the development of the European shale industry could give the Continent’s natural gas consumers a bit more leverage.

#### 3. Your European dependence scenario is political hype that misses the point --- alternative sources of energy are irrelevant as long as Europe has a segmented gas market.

Pierre Noël, 11/7/2008. Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, specialising in energy security and EU energy policy. He is also a Research Associate at the Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. “BEYOND DEPENDENCE: HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIAN GAS,” European Council on Foreign Relations, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/Russia-gas-policy-brief.pdf.

Europe’s dependence on Russian gas has become a central issue in the European Union’s internal debates about its relationship with Russia and its energy policy. The recent war between Georgia and Russia has added a sense of urgency to the EU’s search for a better Russia policy, fuelling fears that Moscow might use its power as a major energy supplier to blackmail Europeans into submission. Following the war, Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, wrote: “No nation can be allowed to exert an energy stranglehold over Europe, and the events of August have shown the critical importance of diversifying our energy supply.”1 Such concerns are exaggerated — and miss the real problem. Two essential figures should inform the debate. First, Russian gas accounts for just 6.5% of the EU’s total primary energy supply, a share that has barely changed since 1990. Second, Russia’s market share of EU gas imports has been halved since 1980, from 80% to just over 40%. Contrary to popular perception, overdependence on Russia is not a pressing issue for Europe2 as a whole. Yet there are important differences between EU Member States. The EU’s eastern national gas markets are, for the most part, small but highly dependent on Russia, whilst the bigger western markets benefit from greater supply diversity. And while the countries that critically depend on Russia for their gas are to be found among the new Member States, Gazprom’s big clients are Germany and Italy, which together account for almost half of all Russian gas consumed in the EU. These national differences would not matter too much if there were a single European gas market. But the reality is that Europe’s gas market is segmented along national lines. There is little cross-border trading within the EU, and when supply disruptions occur – as in January 2006 at the height of the gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia, or, two months later, when a fire at the Rough storage facility disrupted the UK market – we see very little reallocation of supply between national markets. The result is that Russian gas has become an extremely divisive issue in European politics. The highly dependent countries in eastern Europe resent the German, Italian or French pro-Russian stance, which they largely ascribe to the strategic partnerships between Gazprom and importers in these countries. Conversely, Moscow’s self-declared strategic partners in the EU resent the anti-Russian approach of some eastern Member States and argue that cultivating good relations with Russia is essential to the EU’s energy security. Current attempts to use direct diplomacy to solve Europe’s problem with Russian gas are unlikely to succeed because the EU and Russia have divergent interests. Europe wants to depoliticise the EU-Russia gas relationship in order to integrate Russian gas imports into a competitive pan-European gas market and to maximise the volumes it can import from Russia. But Russia - or its current leadership, at least – wants precisely the opposite: to keep the politics in the gas relationship. A depoliticised EU-Russia gas relationship would be a disaster from the Russian leadership’s point of view, as it would leave Russia in something like the position of Norway vis-à-vis Europe or Canada vis-à-vis the US. From Russia’s perspective, a stagnant or even declining gas relationship with Europe is preferable to an expanding but depoliticised gas trade. A politicised gas relationship is a central part of Russia’s European strategy. This explains the failure of the EURussia “energy dialogue” of the late 1990s, the failure to secure Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty, and the failure to link Russia’s entry into the WTO to liberalisation of its gas sector. At the EU-Russia summit in Sochi on 25 May 2006, Russia explicitly rejected proposals advanced by the EU to restructure and depoliticise the gas relationship3. Russia’s vested interest in the status quo drives its fierce opposition to the European pursuit of gas market liberalisation and integration. The most effective way for the EU to counter Russian attempts to divide Member States is to restructure its internal gas market, making it much more difficult for Russia to advance its political interests. This paper will argue that European policymakers should focus on building a single, competitive European gas market by aggressively pursuing legislative and regulatory reforms that will lead to continental-wide competitive trading. Over the past three years, the debate has evolved around three equally unsatisfactory proposals for EU responses to the Russian gas challenge: • Regain energy independence from Russia by developing alternatives to natural gas, especially nuclear power and renewables. This is not a credible option. Although nuclear and renewables are competitors to natural gas, they cannot marginalise it in the medium term. Pushing for alternatives to Russian gas will not keep it from dividing Member States. • Further diversify Europe’s gas supply through aggressive pursuit of sources of non-Russian gas. The record shows that Europe’s gas supply has considerably diversified in recent years, and Russia’s share of EU imports has declined continuously since 1980. Yet during this time Russian gas has become more divisive politically, not less. So it is unclear how further diversification would help resolve the issue. • Bind Russia’s hands by having it accept treaty-backed policy and behavioural disciplines. Such an approach depends entirely on Russian goodwill, which has lately been in short supply. The EU is powerless to force a sovereign state of Russia’s might to bend to treaty-backed disciplines Moscow sees as detrimental to its national interest. The solution to the Russian gas challenge lies not in foreign energy policy but in reform of the European gas market itself. An integrated and competitive European gas market would: • Create the maximum possible degree of solidarity between European gas consumers. • Improve collective supply security by allowing the price mechanism to re-allocate physical supply across the entire market in times of supply or demand shocks. • Make Member States’ bilateral relations with Russia largely irrelevant to the conditions of access to Russian gas for consumers. An integrated market would ‘Europeanise’ bilateral commercial relationships with Gazprom, without the need for political involvement from the EU.

#### 4. LNG is eliminating Russian energy leverage now.

Stratfor, 1/26/2012. “LNG's Expanding Role in Europe,” <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/lngs-expanding-role-europe>.

New liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities under construction in the Netherlands, France and Poland are set to diversify the Continent's energy import options. Europe has traditionally depended on Russia for energy security, a dependence Moscow has exploited to further its interests. These new LNG facilities may disrupt that arrangement, with significant political and economic consequences for Moscow. Analysis For decades Moscow has used its natural gas exports as a principal means of projecting economic and political influence in Europe. Selectively allowing or denying access to Russian natural gas supplies has given Moscow considerable leverage in shaping the political and security posture of countries dependent on those supplies. European dependence on Russian energy has proved to be Moscow's most reliable tool///

to shape the behaviors of other countries -- though Moscow has other means by which to project its influence. In order for this tool to work, however, Russia must possess a meaningful market share -- and Russia's share profile is set to decrease dramatically. By 2014, two large liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities will come online in Western Europe. These facilities largely will remove Russia's market presence in several Western European markets by substantially undercutting Russia's price on natural gas. A third facility in Poland could eventually make that country an energy transit state for the rest of Central Europe. The expanded LNG production could pinch Russian finances as well as diminish Moscow's political leverage. The two Western European LNG facilities -- in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Dunkirk, France -- can already manage 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year of LNG imports. By the end of 2014 they will be capable of importing 34 bcm, a quantity sufficient to end Russian natural gas penetration into France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, with 22 bcm left over. Infrastructure is already in place to facilitate exports elsewhere in Europe from the receiving terminals in Rotterdam and Dunkirk. Some of the excess 22 bcm may go to Switzerland, but with Switzerland only importing 0.3 bcm of Russian natural gas, the impact on Moscow's market share will be minimal. More concerning for Russia is the prospect that excess natural gas will head to northwestern Germany -- specifically to the heavily industrialized Rhine region -- where it will compete directly with Russian natural gas. The Western Europe-sourced LNG will likely do extremely well in that competition, as LNG imported at Rotterdam is price-equivalent to Russian natural gas in Europe. Russia has seen this coming and in preparation has been lowering its asking price for natural gas. This now stands at $308 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) -- a discount of about one-third compared to one year ago. The Russian price is now equivalent to imports at Rotterdam, which currently trade in the $290-$350 range. However, this does not include transport costs. Russia tacks on a $400 per tcm surcharge to cover the costs of shipping natural gas from production sites in western Siberia -- a charge Moscow is now reconsidering. Rotterdam, by contrast, sits at the heart of Europe. Unless Russia lowers its transit fees, even the newly discounted price of Russian natural gas will double that of LNG-derived gas. Decisions on choosing energy suppliers are not made in a vacuum, and Russia has worked hard to cultivate personal and business relationships with political figures in importer countries. Moscow has also used its dominant position in the European energy market to acquire transport infrastructure, purchasing pieces of pipeline networks throughout Europe. But even considering Moscow's well-established ties to political leaders, it is difficult to see many Europeans choosing to pay Russia double the cost of natural gas imported via LNG terminals. The worst-case scenario for Russia would see the 22 bcm of LNG-sourced supplies displace an equal amount of Russian supplies -- that would deny Russia some $15 billion in income. That scenario is unlikely -- Russia will more likely lose out on between $5 billion to $10 billion of German income. Germany has committed itself to shifting its energy mix away from nuclear and coal-fired power plants. This will increase Germany's short-term demand for natural gas, which could mitigate the effect on Russia's 50 percent market share in Germany. It is not quite an all-or-nothing game. The direction Germany takes its energy consumption over the next three years, in response to the rising availability of cheaper LNG, will give critical insights into the value Germany places on its relationship with Russia. Dunkirk and Rotterdam are not the only facilities under construction that are changing the energy balance of Europe. A third facility is located in the Polish port of Swinoujscie. This facility should also be completed by 2014, with an initial capacity of 5 bcm -- about half of Poland's annual demand. Warsaw has launched the terminal with the express purpose of mitigating its dependence upon Russian energy. Success at Swinoujscie would certainly encourage Poland to expand its use of LNG, and Poland might even -- albeit several years from now at a minimum -- become a transit state for LNG-sourced fuel to reach interior Central European states. None of this necessarily spells disaster for Russia. 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## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### AND production ends once removal is done.

**US Code 00** [Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, as amended Through P.L. 106–580, Dec. 29, 2000, <http://epw.senate.gov/ocsla.pdf>]

(k) The term “exploration” means the process of searching for minerals, including

(1) geophysical surveys where magnetic, gravity, seismic, or other systems are used to detect or imply the presence of such minerals, and

(2) any drilling, whether on or off known geological structures, including the drilling of a well in which a discovery of oil or natural gas in paying quantities is made and the drilling of any additional delineation well after such discovery which is needed to delineate any reservoir and to enable the lessee to determine whether to proceed with development and production;

(l) The term “development” means those activities which take place following discovery of minerals in paying quantities, including geophysical activity, drilling, platform construction, and operation of all onshore support facilities, and which are for the purpose of ultimately producing the minerals discovered;

(m) The term “production” means those activities which take place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of minerals, including such removal, field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation monitoring, maintenance, and work-over drilling;

(n) The term “antitrust law” means—

(1) the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.);

(2) the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.);

(3) the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.);

(4) the Wilson Tariff Act (15 U.S.C. 8 et seq.); or

(5) the Act of June 19, 1936, chapter 592 (15 U.S.C. 13, 13a, 13b, and 21a);

#### Here’s the best card on the Topic – quotas and export controls might result in a limit on PRODUCTION but they are absolutely distinct. This card talks about their interpretation and says they are wrong.

EHRING & CHINALE 11 Assistant to Mr. Péter Balás, Deputy Director-General at the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission, responsible for multilateral affairs, as well as trade defence instruments and bilateral trade relations with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Until 2008, Lothar Ehring served in the Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade that is responsible for Legal Aspects of Trade Policy. He was the Coordinator for legal issues of multilateral trade, handled several WTO disputes and also represented the European Community in the negotiations on the reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding [Lothar Ehring & Gian Franco Chinale, “Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: Wto, Nafta and Energy Charter” p. 134-5]

The perfect example to test and discuss this interpretation is the famous case of OPEC production quotas. These quotas. as implemented at the national levels of OPEC members, are horizontal restrictions on production. They limit exportation no more than domestic sales, and yet the argument is made time and again that they fall foul of Article XI:I of the GATT 1994.” The proponents of this thesis recognize that they are on thin ice. given that production limitations are as remote from being border measures as a restriction can possibly be. Equally clear is the fact that a production limitation definition does not discriminate against exports, neither de jure nor de facto. The proponents of the OPEC GATT-illegality attempt to overcome this conclusion with the argument that for some of the oil exporting countries in question, the near totality of the production goes to export. This. however, is legally irrelevant to the question of whether there is a discrimination against or higher burden on exports. The quantitative relationship between domestic consumption and exports can be very imbalanced for reasons of production and consumption capacities, in large part for reasons of a country’s size and the foreign demand for the product concerned. Also the conceptual argument that a restriction on production can be decomposed into a restriction on exportation as well a restriction on domestic sales is not plausible. The production restriction is precisely and inseparably both at the same time and this makes a qualitative difference that is impossible to set aside.

### AT: F/I

#### The aff isn’t an example of a topical incentive

Gouchoe 2k—North Carolina State University, National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Susan, December 2000, Local Government and Community Programs and Incentives for Renewable Energy— National Report, http://seg.fsu.edu/Library/casestudy%20of%20incentives.pdf]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a summary of the renewable energy programs and incentives of 45¶ communities in 23 states as collected and catalogued by the Interstate Renewable Energy¶ Council’s (IREC) Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) project. Also included are summaries of state initiatives that impact implementation of renewable energy¶ technologies on the local level. Programs and incentives in this report include:

COMMUNITY INVESTMENT & AWARENESS PROGRAMS

v Renewable Energy Projects

v Education & Assistance

v Green Pricing Programs

v Green Power Purchasing

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

v Rebates, Grants, & Loans

v Tax Incentives

v Green Building Incentives

v Industrial Recruitment

RULES, REGULATIONS & POLICIES

v Solar & Wind Access

v Net Metering

v Construction & Design

v Contractor Licensing

v Equipment Certification

v Public Benefits Funds

v Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards

v Disclosure & Certification

Established in 1995, DSIRE is an ongoing project to summarize incentives, programs, and¶ policies for renewable energy. The project is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy’s¶ Office of Power Technologies and is managed by the North Carolina Solar Center. DSIRE on¶ Line makes the DSIRE database accessible via the web at:¶ http://www.ncsc.ncsu.edu/dsire.htm. The website is updated daily and includes search¶ capabilities for all incentives. In addition to state and local programs, the website features¶ utility programs and a searchable bibliography.

#### Our definition comes from Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency—prefer that—it’s the most up to date & comprehensive source for incentives information.

Gouchoe 2k—North Carolina State University, National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Susan, December 2000, Local Government and Community Programs and Incentives for Renewable Energy— National Report, http://seg.fsu.edu/Library/casestudy%20of%20incentives.pdf]

DSIRE Project Overview

The Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) serves as the nation’s most¶ comprehensive source of information on the status of programs and incentives for renewable¶ energy. The database tracks these programs at the state, utility, local, and community level.¶ Established in 1995, DSIRE is an ongoing project of the Interstate Renewable Energy Council¶ (IREC) and is managed by the North Carolina Solar Center with funding from the U.S.¶ Department of Energy’s Office of Power Technologies.

The first three phases of the DSIRE project—surveys of state financial incentives, state¶ regulatory policies, and utility programs and incentives—have been completed. Information¶ from these databases has been published in three previous reports:

National Summary Report on State Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy (1997);

National Summary Report on State Programs and Regulatory Policies for Renewable Energy

(1998); and

National Summary Report on Utility Programs and Incentives for Renewable Energy (1999).¶ These reports summarize incentives, programs, and policies that promote active and passive¶ solar, photovoltaics, wind, biomass, alternative fuels, geothermal, hydropower, and waste¶ energy sources. Given the rapidly changing status of state activities, an updated report—¶ National Summary Report on State Financial and Regulatory Incentives for Renewable¶ Energy—has been produced concurrently with this report on local initiatives.¶ While reports serve as a snapshot of the status of incentives and programs, constant revisions¶ and additions to the database maintain DSIRE’s role as the most up-to-date, national¶ clearinghouse of information on incentives and programs for renewable energy. Through¶ DSIRE on Line, the DSIRE database is accessible via the web at:¶ http://www.ncsc.ncsu.edu/dsire.htm. In 2001, federal incentives will be added to the database,¶ thereby providing a complete and comprehensive database of renewable energy incentives at¶ all levels—national, state, and local.

IREC is a nonprofit consortium of state and local government renewable energy officials and¶ is uniquely situated to oversee the effort to compile information on state, local, and utility¶ incentives. IREC ensures that all information products produced are disseminated widely to¶ federal, state and local agencies, federal laboratories, and other appropriate audiences.¶ The primary subcontractor to IREC for the DSIRE project is the North Carolina Solar Center.¶ Established in 1988, the Solar Center is located in the College of Engineering at North¶ Carolina State University in Raleigh, NC and is sponsored by the State Energy Office in the¶ North Carolina Department of Administration. The Solar Center conducts programs in four¶ areas: policy analysis, research and commercialization, technical assistance and training, and¶ education and outreach.

### AT: W/M F.I.

#### FOR is exclusive—

Clegg 95—J.D., 1981 Yale Law School; the author is vice president and general counsel of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. (Roger, “Reclaiming The Text of The Takings Clause,” 46 S.C. L. Rev. 531, Summer, lexis)

Even if it made no sense to limit the clause to takings "for public use"--and, as discussed below, it might make very good sense--that is the way the clause reads. It is not at all ambiguous. The prepositional phrase simply cannot be read as broadening rather than narrowing the clause's scope. Indeed, a prepositional phrase beginning with "for" appears twice more in the Fifth Amendment, and in both cases there is no doubt that the phrase is narrowing the scope of the Amendment. n20

#### Financial incentives are directly tied to an outcome—any other interpretation is too broad and allows a limitless number of incentives.

Williams 7—Nova Scotia Cooperative Council (Bob, Submission in Response to Consultation Paper: Renewed Energy Strategy 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy/Download.aspx?serverfn=./files/drm/f0c518e8-c38f-4d7f-9bca-e17ccc2b0b8b.pdf&downloadfn=submission%20-%2007%20-%20Bob%20Williams%20-%2020071212.pdf&contenttype=)

Anyone who has a reasonable amount of experience or knowledge of renewable energy development knows that there are two general approaches. One being the RPS and tendering model and the other is one of fixed price incentives, commonly known as feed in tariffs (FIT). It is also well recognized that if one is serious about local economic benefits being derived from renewable energy, indeed facilitating or stimulating ‘sustainable prosperity’, then the model known as ‘Community Power’ or CBED, Community Based Energy Development, is one that must be considered. It is not co-incidental that FIT as an incentive based policy go hand-in-hand with CBED. The word incentive is paramount here because it makes clear the fact that the primary objective of these mechanisms is not simply least direct cost, but is to achieve specific policy goals that are in addition to and complimentary to the generation of clean energy. Such goals commonly include promotion of technologies, siting of renewable energy projects and encouragement of new ownership models. In fact FITs were first designed and adopted in Europe to promote a specific ownership model, that of community ownership through co-operatives.

### AT: Prod =/= extract

#### THEY EXPLODE NATURAL GAS—it has a virtually infinite number of current and many future possible uses. Makes it uniquely bad

Natural Gas.Org 11 [Uses of Natural Gas, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/uses.asp]

For hundreds of years, natural gas has been known as a very useful substance. The Chinese discovered a very long time ago that the energy in natural gas could be harnessed, and used to heat water. In the early days of the natural gas industry, the gas was mainly used to light streetlamps, and the occasional house. However, with much improved distribution channels and technological advancements, natural gas is being used in ways never thought possible.

There are so many different applications for this fossil fuel that it is hard to provide an exhaustive list of everything it is used for. And no doubt, new uses are being discovered all the time. To learn more about technological advancements in the natural gas industry, click here. Natural gas has many applications, commercially, in your home, in industry, and even in the transportation sector! While the uses described here are not exhaustive, they may help to show just how many things natural gas can do.

According to the Energy Information Administration, energy from natural gas accounts for 24 percent of total energy consumed in the United States, making it a vital component of the nation's energy supply. For more detailed information on the demand for and supply of energy, and natural gas, including forecasts and outlooks, click here.

Natural gas is used across all sectors, in varying amounts. The graph below gives an idea of the proportion of natural gas use per sector. The industrial sector accounts for the greatest proportion of natural gas use in the United States, with the residential sector consuming the second greatest quantity of natural gas.

### AT: Russia

#### LNG is eliminating Russian energy leverage now.

Stratfor, 1/26/2012. “LNG's Expanding Role in Europe,” <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/lngs-expanding-role-europe>.

New liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities under construction in the Netherlands, France and Poland are set to diversify the Continent's energy import options. Europe has traditionally depended on Russia for energy security, a dependence Moscow has exploited to further its interests. These new LNG facilities may disrupt that arrangement, with significant political and economic consequences for Moscow. Analysis For decades Moscow has used its natural gas exports as a principal means of projecting economic and political influence in Europe. Selectively allowing or denying access to Russian natural gas supplies has given Moscow considerable leverage in shaping the political and security posture of countries dependent on those supplies. European dependence on Russian energy has proved to be Moscow's most reliable tool///

to shape the behaviors of other countries -- though Moscow has other means by which to project its influence. In order for this tool to work, however, Russia must possess a meaningful market share -- and Russia's share profile is set to decrease dramatically. By 2014, two large liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities will come online in Western Europe. These facilities largely will remove Russia's market presence in several Western European markets by substantially undercutting Russia's price on natural gas. A third facility in Poland could eventually make that country an energy transit state for the rest of Central Europe. The expanded LNG production could pinch Russian finances as well as diminish Moscow's political leverage. The two Western European LNG facilities -- in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Dunkirk, France -- can already manage 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year of LNG imports. By the end of 2014 they will be capable of importing 34 bcm, a quantity sufficient to end Russian natural gas penetration into France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, with 22 bcm left over. Infrastructure is already in place to facilitate exports elsewhere in Europe from the receiving terminals in Rotterdam and Dunkirk. Some of the excess 22 bcm may go to Switzerland, but with Switzerland only importing 0.3 bcm of Russian natural gas, the impact on Moscow's market share will be minimal. More concerning for Russia is the prospect that excess natural gas will head to northwestern Germany -- specifically to the heavily industrialized Rhine region -- where it will compete directly with Russian natural gas. The Western Europe-sourced LNG will likely do extremely well in that competition, as LNG imported at Rotterdam is price-equivalent to Russian natural gas in Europe. Russia has seen this coming and in preparation has been lowering its asking price for natural gas. This now stands at $308 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) -- a discount of about one-third compared to one year ago. The Russian price is now equivalent to imports at Rotterdam, which currently trade in the $290-$350 range. However, this does not include transport costs. Russia tacks on a $400 per tcm surcharge to cover the costs of shipping natural gas from production sites in western Siberia -- a charge Moscow is now reconsidering. Rotterdam, by contrast, sits at the heart of Europe. Unless Russia lowers its transit fees, even the newly discounted price of Russian natural gas will double that of LNG-derived gas. Decisions on choosing energy suppliers are not made in a vacuum, and Russia has worked hard to cultivate personal and business relationships with political figures in importer countries. Moscow has also used its dominant position in the European energy market to acquire transport infrastructure, purchasing pieces of pipeline networks throughout Europe. But even considering Moscow's well-established ties to political leaders, it is difficult to see many Europeans choosing to pay Russia double the cost of natural gas imported via LNG terminals. The worst-case scenario for Russia would see the 22 bcm of LNG-sourced supplies displace an equal amount of Russian supplies -- that would deny Russia some $15 billion in income. That scenario is unlikely -- Russia will more likely lose out on between $5 billion to $10 billion of German income. Germany has committed itself to shifting its energy mix away from nuclear and coal-fired power plants. This will increase Germany's short-term demand for natural gas, which could mitigate the effect on Russia's 50 percent market share in Germany. It is not quite an all-or-nothing game. The direction Germany takes its energy consumption over the next three years, in response to the rising availability of cheaper LNG, will give critical insights into the value Germany places on its relationship with Russia. Dunkirk and Rotterdam are not the only facilities under construction that are changing the energy balance of Europe. A third facility is located in the Polish port of Swinoujscie. This facility should also be completed by 2014, with an initial capacity of 5 bcm -- about half of Poland's annual demand. Warsaw has launched the terminal with the express purpose of mitigating its dependence upon Russian energy. Success at Swinoujscie would certainly encourage Poland to expand its use of LNG, and Poland might even -- albeit several years from now at a minimum -- become a transit state for LNG-sourced fuel to reach interior Central European states. None of this necessarily spells disaster for Russia. Moscow exports just over 200 bcm to Europe annually; France and the Low Countries are not considered core to Russian economic strategies; and the new French, Dutch and Polish facilities combined directly threaten to displace only 12 percent of the European market. Italy and Turkey -- two of Russia's most lucrative markets -- are so far largely unaffected by the increasing attractiveness of LNG, and Russia will most certainly not leave the German market without a considerable struggle. Still, the changes should have a demonstrable impact on Russian finances. Russia's preemptive price cuts reduced its income by some $6 billion. LNG will directly deny Russia another $9 billion to $10 billion in income from France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland. And that's before factoring in any potential loss of German market share. But as important as the economic hit will be, the political hit will hurt even more. Germans and Central Europeans have known for the past decade that their sole meaningful option for energy security lies with Russia, and Moscow demands a political price for that security. The newfound cheapness of LNG suggests that this may change, and as Europe's use of LNG expands it cannot help but diminish the political leverage that Russia has grown accustomed to wielding.

#### 5. Europe is building pipeline capacity to reduce reliance

**Koven 12**—Colonel in the United States Air Force [Colonel Alexander L. Koven, “Under the Yoke: Europe's Natural Gas Dependency on Russia,” Strategy Research Project, 01-03-2012

European leaders recognize the threat that over-reliance on Russian gas causes, and have developed an energy strategy to reduce its reliance on Russian gas as well as minimize its carbon footprint. The "20-20-20 Initiative" is an EU energy policy that "has evolved around the common objective of ensuring the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products and services on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while contributing to the EU’s wider social and climate goals."58 The 20-20-20 Initiative has three main goals. First, by 2020 the EU should be emitting twenty percent less greenhouse gases as compared to 1990 levels, second it should have a share of renewables in its energy mix equal to at least twenty percent, and finally its energy efficiency should improve by at least twenty percent.59 To meet these goals, the EU will spend approximately €1 trillion "both to diversify existing resources and replace equipment and to cater for challenging and changing energy requirements."60 A key structural change is the creation of pipeline infrastructure that can bring non-Russian gas into Europe. Pg. 12

### Ext—Methane

#### 4% will get leaked

**Kenworthy 12**—Senior Fellow with the Public Lands team @American Progress [Tom Kenworthy, “[Natural Gas Industry Must Tighten Up Methane Leaks — And Save $2 Billion Per Year In The Process](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/03/29/454445/natural-gas-industry-methane-leaks-save-2-billion/),” Think Progress, Mar 29, 2012 at 9:38 am, pg. http://tinyurl.com/8zrz2ws

In a stunning [report](http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/09/09/315845/natural-gas-switching-from-coal-to-gas-increases-warming-for-decades/) last year, the National Center for Atmospheric Research concluded that substituting natural gas for coal as an energy source would actually increase global warming for many decades—unless methane leakage rates can be kept below 2%.

Even though we don’t know much about the actual leakage rate for methane—the major component of natural gas and a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO2—that NCAR study is bad news. It’s especially bad for shale gas, in part because hydraulic fracturing is believed to have a higher life-cycle leakage rate during the production and transport phases of development.

In a separate NOAA study in February, researchers found that natural gas companies in a Colorado field were losing about 4% of methane during production, and that doesn’t include the losses from leaks in the pipeline and distribution system.

The task of controlling fugitive methane leaks is critical if switching to natural gas is going to do anything to aide the fight against climate change.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 1NR—Trade Add On

**No escalation.**

**Bearce 3** (David, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. @ U. Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace”, 47:3, Blackwell-Synergy)

Even as we accept that such trade dispute settlement mechanisms help resolve economic conflict, it is not clear that this finding should have any strong application to the dependent variable of inter-state military conflict. On this point, it is important to distinguish between different types of inter-state conflict—economic versus military (McMillan, 1997:39)—and recognize that disputes about banana tariffs, for example, are not likely to escalate into military confrontations. While military conflict often has economic antecedents, there is little evidence that trade wars ever become shooting wars. In terms of inter-state disagreements with real potential for military conflict, scholars highlight territorial disputes (Vasquez, 1993; Hensel, 2000; Huth, 2000). The trade dispute settlement mechanisms embedded in regional commercial institutions simply have no jurisdiction or power to resolve highly contentious territorial disagreements.

### 1NR—Overview

**Undermining Russian relations causes terrorism, proliferation, multiple hotspots, and adventurism. Causes Balkans intervention.**

**Allison 11**—Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow—Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and **energy**. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, **Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war**. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

#### Their answers don’t assume the change Romney will create—his rhetoric creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of aggression

**Bandow 12**—Senior Fellow at CATO [Doug Bandow, 4/23/12, Romney and Russia: Complicating American Relations, National Interest, p. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/romney-russia-complicating-american-relationships-6836]

Mitt Romney has become the inevitable Republican presidential candidate. He’s hoping to paint Barack Obama as weak, but his attempt at a flanking maneuver on the right may complicate America’s relationship with Eastern Europe and beyond. Romney recently charged Russia with being America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” As Jacob Heilbrunn of National Interest pointed out, this claim embodies a monumental self-contradiction, attempting to claim “credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the one hand [while] predicting dire threats from Russia on the other.” Thankfully, the U.S.S.R. really is gone, and neither all the king’s men nor Vladimir Putin can put it back together. It is important to separate behavior which is grating, even offensive, and that which is threatening. Putin is no friend of liberty, but his unwillingness to march lock-step with Washington does not mean that he wants conflict with America. Gordon Hahn of CSIS observes: Yet despite NATO expansion, U.S. missile defense, Jackson-Vanik and much else, Moscow has refused to become a U.S. foe, cooperating with the West on a **host of issues** from North Korea to the war against jihadism. Most recently, Moscow agreed to the establishment of a NATO base in Ulyanovsk. These are hardly the actions of America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s charge is both silly and foolish. This doesn’t mean the U.S. should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But **treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one**. Moreover, treating Moscow like a foe will make Russia **more suspicious** of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union—and especially Washington’s determination to continue expanding NATO. After all, if another country ostentatiously called the U.S. its chief geopolitical threat, ringed America with bases, and established military relationships with areas that had broken away from the U.S., Washington would not react well. It might react, well, a lot like Moscow has been reacting. Although it has established better relations with the West, Russia still might not get along with some of its neighbors, most notably Georgia, with its irresponsibly confrontational president. However, Washington should not give Moscow additional reasons to **indulge its paranoia**.

**Can’t solve warming without Russian cooperation.**

**Charap 9—**Associate Director for the Russia and Eurasia Program at American Progress [Samuel, “After the Reset: A strategy and new agenda for U.S. Russia policy”, July, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/pdf/russia\_report.pdf]

The United States should directly engage Russia on reaching a new international climate change agreement. An extension or successor to the Kyoto treaty will be negotiated at the U.N. climate talks in Copenhagen at the end of this year. The buildup to that meeting is bringing into focus the need for broad-based involvement from all countries— especially the developed countries and major emerging economies in the developing world—to create a consensus on global climate change action. There is insufficient attention being paid to the role that Russia will play in a new agreement given its status as a major contributor to the problem of global warming and the fact that it is a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol.

The likely structure of the Copenhagen treaty makes Russia one of the unacknowledged keys to success. The Kyoto agreement could not have been enacted unless at least 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of global carbon emissions signed and ratified it. The signatories at the time did not meet the latter criterion, and it would therefore not have gone into effect if then-President Putin had not signed the treaty in November 2004. We can expect a similar proviso in the post-Kyoto treaty, and a Russian signature will likely again be critical.

The Russians are likely to be opposed to stronger caps on emissions and domestic mitigation mechanisms in a new treaty, since those in the Kyoto Protocol will not require them to make emissions cuts until around 2020.29 Yet without more stringent caps the goal of cutting global emissions in half by 2050—which is necessary to avoid the worst consequences of climate change—will be significantly harder to achieve.

We therefore need to bring Russia on board in order to avoid a deadlock in international climate negotiations. The administration should work with the Russians to demonstrate that emissions caps further economic modernization—one of the Kremlin’s oft-repeated goals—and sustain growth and thus are in their long-term economic interest. Immediate bilateral engagement is key to making Russia a partner in addressing climate change. It is not in the U.S. interest for Russia to be a reluctant participant or a spoiler. We must listen and not lecture, since a finger-wagging approach will only backfire in the Russian context.

**They conceded Romney would start current trade wars – those escalate.**

**Landy 7**—Director Of Research And Strategy At The Atlantic Media Company, Publisher Of The Atlantic Monthly, National Journal, And Government Executive Magazines [Ben Landy, April 3, 2007, http://chinaredux.com/2007/04/03/protectionism-and-war/#comments]

The greatest threat for the 21st century is that these economic flare-ups between the US and China will not be contained, but might spill over into the realm of military aggression between these two world powers. Economic conflict breeds military conflict. The stakes of trade override the ideological power of the Taiwan issue. China's ability to continue growing at a rapid rate takes precedence, since there can be no sovereignty for China without economic growth. The United States' role as the world's superpower is dependent on its ability to lead economically. As many of you will know from reading this blog, I do not believe that war between the US and China is imminent, or a foregone conclusion in the future. I certainly do not hope for war. But I have little doubt that protectionist policies on both sides greatly increase the likelihood of conflict far more than increases in military budgets and anti-satellite tests

**Extinction**

**Wittner 11**—Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany [Lawrence S. Wittner, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011—18:37 pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries **national conflicts have led to wars**, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon.

The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the **South China Sea**, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.

Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. **Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands**. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “**nuclear winter**” around the globe—destroying agriculture, [and] creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to **improve U.S.-China relations**. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

**That turns warming.**

**Lyman 9**—Co-director of the Energy, Environment and Economics Program @ Atlantic Council [John R. Lyman, “On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security,” Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center, The Atlantic Council, Washington, DC March 4-6, 2009]

The time for debate about the winners and losers in the supply of energy is over. Nuclear energy is needed more than ever as a non-carbon emitting source of electric supply and it can play a role in providing a secure, sustainable, affordable energy supply. The bottom line is that both the U.S. and China need a diversified energy production platform and technology portfolio, including a vibrant nuclear industry. Given the necessity of using all the forms of energy at our disposal while transitioning to a de-carbonized portfolio relying increasingly on renewables, integrated solutions are needed. Recognizing that this is not an either-or world, cooperation on nuclear energy can lead to expanded cooperation on other energy programs such as clean coal technology and renewable energy R&D. As the scientists and engineers begin to work together on nuclear programs, both will find ways to start other joint efforts. Together the U.S. and China have the ability to set the standards for world’s upcoming climate negotiations. With 2 billion people in the world suffering from a lack of energy and facing increasing shortages of adequate water supplies, developed countries are in a position to spread the benefits of electricity around the globe. To do this, every available source of electric supply must be deployed, and the U.S. and China, who will have the world’s two largest nuclear power programs in approximately 20 years, and who may also be the world’s top two economies, will be able to lead the way. This Dialogue provided a very good information base and an excellent platform to help the U.S. and China to work together to bring the benefits of nuclear energy to our nations and to the others in this world suffering from a lack of the basics for life. The U.S. and China are the world’s largest energy consumers—and the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gasses. Both countries must increase their use of nuclear power to help meet energy demands in a carbon-constrained environment. Relevant government agencies and key stakeholders must educate their publics about the parameters involved in producing a diverse energy supply in order to understand the worth of sacrifices that will be needed. Cooperation between the U.S. and China will be mutually beneficial. It is to the U.S.’s benefit that China designs and operates a safe nuclear power program. China is a significant market for the U.S. nuclear industry and provides an opportunity to maintain its manufacturing capabilities until its first new U.S. orders get underway. U.S. industry presence in China also increases relationships and communications thus improving U.S. security. The unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to the Chinese will, in turn, help them develop clean sources of electricity sorely needed to address the fast growing needs of its economy and public. As Chinese capabilities grow, the nuclear supply chain is reinforced, supporting further opportunities for U.S. companies to expand reactor sales abroad. American and Chinese companies together can take advantage of their mutual competitive edges in technology and geography to expand into new markets. Cooperation and leadership are key and complimentary components in the U.S.’s and China’s efforts to ensure nuclear power’s contribution to meeting energy demand. Cooperation on technology development, human resources, security and safety will form the basis for their leadership on the world stage. Their combined actions will matter greatly in providing a quality environment with adequate energy supplies. The world is watching! The Chinese participants signaled their desire to improve both government-to-government cooperation and commercial sector ties. It appears that the U.S. government is equally interested in working with China to tackle the overarching challenges of developing a safe and secure commercial nuclear fuel cycle. By supporting and participating in this Dialogue, U.S. industry and government participants have demonstrated their commitment to dealing with the challenges to realize the burgeoning nuclear trade between the two countries. Pg. 31-32

**Romney guts the EPA**

**Rettig 11** (Jessica—US News, “EPA Budget and Power Under Attack from Republicans”, 7/8, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/07/08/epa-budget-and-power-under-attack-from-republicans?PageNr=2>)

Republicans, in the past, have labeled the EPA's proposed rules on greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act as a backdoor way around the failure of **cap-and-trade legislation** in Congress in 2009, which was intended by its supporters as a way to address climate change. According to Manik Roy, vice president of federal government outreach at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, despite what some members of Congress say, the EPA is simply following orders according to Congress' authorization of the Clean Air Act and subsequent Supreme Court rulings which upheld the EPA's authority over greenhouse gases. Moran told reporters Thursday that Democrats are "going to have to fight" to keep Republicans from using riders to block EPA's rules. During the budget showdown in the spring, Republicans were nearly able to leverage a ban on the EPA's power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, like carbon dioxide, but eventually lost that battle. As this funding fight unfolds, the EPA also looms as a possible issue in the 2012 presidential election. Already Minnesota GOP Rep. Michele Bachmann, an avowed climate skeptic who is widely seen as having entered the top tier of candidates, has come out strong against the EPA as the "job-killing organization of America." She even suggested that she'd try to abolish it if in office. [See our cartoons on the 2012 GOP field.]But even with a more moderate candidate like former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney, who has said he thinks climate change should be addressed, the stakes for the EPA could **still be significant**, especially if the issue of the agency's budget is the focus. **Any potential Republican** administration would be less likely than President Obama to back the EPA's **funding and regulatory power**. In that case, the debate over the EPA and climate change would not be whether climate change is a problem, but what the EPA should to do about it, says Roy. Still, even in the face of scrutiny, EPA administrator Lisa Jackson rolled out an additional interstate pollution rule on coal plants under the Clean Air Act Thursday and is poised to continue to implement rules on climate change as planned.

**EPA solves warming**

**Smith 7** (Brian, Earth Justice, EPA Petitioned to Reduce Global Warming Pollution from Ships, DA 7-15-2010, http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/007/epa-petitioned-to-reduce-global-warming-pollution-from-ships.html)

The April 2007 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court clearly established that the Clean Air Act gives the EPA authority to address global warming. The EPA must act immediately and issue regulations to limit pollution that contributes to global warming. The petitions filed today begin the process of imposing mandatory regulations on the marine transportation sector. The petitioners asked the EPA to respond within 180 days. The Climate Change Problem The science is unequivocal. Global climate change is real, occurring at an alarming rate with catastrophic consequences, and is caused primarily by human activity. Ships are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The global fleet of marine vessels releases almost three percent of the world's carbon dioxide, an amount comparable to the emissions of Canada. Because of their huge number and inefficient operating practices, marine vessels release a large volume of global warming pollutants, particularly carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and black carbon (or soot). Despite their impact on the global climate, greenhouse gas emissions from ships are not currently regulated by the United States government.  In addition, these emissions are not limited under the Kyoto Protocol or other international treaties that address global warming. Ships' Contribution to the Climate Change Problem Global shipping activity has increased by three percent per year for the last three decades and this rate of growth is projected to increase. If fuel use remains unchanged, shipping pollution will increase substantially, potentially doubling from 2002 levels by 2020 and tripling by 2030. "Global warming pollution from ships is a substantial problem. But fortunately, it's one that can be solved," said Danielle Fugere of Friends of the Earth. "Slower speeds, cleaner fuels, better ships -- the steps that the shipping industry must take are clear. **It's up to the EPA to ensure these steps are taken**." Why We Should Care Climate change is already causing widespread melting of Arctic glaciers and sea ice, shortening the snow season and raising global temperatures.   The resulting sea level rise could eliminate up to 22 percent of the worlds coastal wetlands and as much as 43 percent of U.S. wetlands. Wetlands provide habitat, protect against floods and storm surges and contribute to local economies. Our oceans and freshwater environments, including organisms at the bottom of the aquatic food chain, are already under stress from climate change. Ranges of algae, plankton and fish have shifted in response to changes in water temperature, ice cover, oxygen content, salinity and circulation. If they die off, entire aquatic ecosystems will follow. Among the species that are struggling to adapt to rapidly changing habitats are cold-water fish, such as salmon and cod, polar bears, walruses, seals, whales, caribou, reindeer, corals, turtles and countless species of migrating sea birds. "If we're going to slow the Arctic melt-down and save Arctic species, we must control global warming pollution from ships," said Kassie Siegel, Climate Program Director for the Center for Biological Diversity. "Implementing the solutions in the petition is the first step toward slowing warming and protecting these species' future." Human health is also impacted by climate change caused by global warming pollution. Climate-related illnesses include air-quality related heart and lung disease, heat-stroke, malnutrition, and casualties from fires, storms and floods. "Climate change is threatening ocean life from the Arctic to the tropics. Shipping pollution has been given a free pass so far and it's way past time to fix that," said Dr. Michael Hirshfield, Oceana's Senior Vice President for North America and Chief Scientist.

decision by Israel to attack Iran, for example, would certainly scramble things.

### 1NR—2AC 1

**It’s close—changes matter**

**Cook 8/25/12**—Elections Guru, My Hero [Charlie Cook, It Shouldn’t Be Close, http://cookpolitical.com/story/4696]

Just about any analysis of the 2012 presidential election should start with words to the effect that this is a very close race, that close races can go either way, and that many different factors—convention speeches, debates, verbal miscues, overseas conflicts—can change the trajectory of such a race. A decision by Israel to attack Iran, for example, would certainly scramble things.

**1NR—2AC 3**

**Presidential Debates irrelevant—never swung one**

**Cohn 9/14/12**—Blogger, Staff at The New Republic [Nate Cohn, The Meaninglessness of Debates. There you go again. <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/107251/the-meaninglessness-debates>]

In the mythology of the modern presidential campaign, nothing looms larger than the debates. Elections are already compared to military conflicts, and three times every four years, Americans watch the two candidates battle it out onstage. This year is no different, and a chorus of political analysts is gearing up to argue that the debates will decide the election. But history suggests that these events won’t be as influential as the pundits or TV ratings suggest. In fact, in the past 50 years, they have not flipped the outcome of a single presidential election.

Consider the face-offs between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960. According to campaign lore, television viewers were swayed by Kennedy’s strong performances, which allayed concerns about his inexperience. Yet Kennedy wound up winning by less than one-quarter of one percent, even though the single Gallup poll conducted prior to the debates showed Nixon up merely a single percentage point. Clearly 1960 was close and the debates might have been a factor, but it is difficult to argue that they were decisive. The debates supposedly put Reagan over the top in 1980, but he had already taken enough of a lead to win. His gains were likely the result of Reagan voters who briefly switched to “undecided” following the Democratic Convention and were already returning to the Gipper.

For every example of the debates aiding a candidate, there is an example of a debate failing to provide the boost one might have expected. In 1976, Ford was losing by double digits prior to his ludicrous assertion that there was “no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.” But he steadily gained and wound up finishing in a tight two-point race. In 1988, Michael Dukakis gave an emotionless response to a hypothetical question about the brutal rape of his wife. Even so, George H.W. Bush, already leading, made only negligible gains. Clinton outdebated Bush and Bob Dole, but the election results were closer than the pre-debate polls.

**1NR—2AC 4**

**Silver proves—highly successful in September—data sides negative.**

**Silver 9/10/12**—Elections Guru [Nate Silver, Sept. 9: Call It as You See It, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/sept-9-call-it-as-you-see-it/]

I’ve been picking up some sentiment from analysts and journalists in my Twitter feed recently, who correctly note that polling around the party conventions can be volatile. They suggest that we ought to wait for more data before concluding very much about the bounces that the conventions have produced.

I’d love to have more data. I’d love it if we had a dozen national tracking polls rather than four. I’d love it if we had a pollster who was spending tens of thousands of dollars to poll every single swing state every single day.

It’s also the case that we’ll know more about the state of the race in two weeks than we know now — and we’ll know more about in four weeks than we do in two.

But we publish our forecasts every day. The goal is to make what we hope is the most accurate possible forecast given the information available at that time.

**Saying “wait for more data” sort of misses the point**. What about the data that we have on hand already? Is it compelling enough to suggest that there has been some change in condition of the race? Or isn’t it?

That’s really the central question that we seek to answer with our forecast models. On some days, the trend is a little more obvious than on others. But we make forecasts when it is easy to do so, and we make forecasts when it’s hard.

One of my pet peeves, when people go back and look at how different forecasting methods have performed, is that they tend to focus only on the last forecast that was produced just in advance of the election. Our forecasts did pretty well by that standard in 2008, and in 2010. But the forecasts we make on Election Day morning are the easy ones! There are tons of polls in every state, very few undecided voters left in the race, and no time remaining for global or economic events to intervene. There is still some skill required to go through the electoral math in elections that are close enough for it to matter. But otherwise, our forecasts are likely to be very, very close to those of our competitors by Election Day.

Instead, where a forecasting model has the potential to add more value is precisely when the information is murkier — either by (correctly) discerning a trend a few days before other methods do, or (just as importantly) by avoiding attaching too much significance to one based on flimsy evidence.

The most impressive thing that our model did in 2008, in my view, was not in “calling” all but one of the states right on Election Day. There was very little doubt about who was favored in perhaps 46 or 47 of these states. The other three or four were tossups — and whether you guessed the winner right had as much to do with luck as skill.

Rather, it was what the model did in September of that year, when it detected very, very quickly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers that John McCain’s goose was cooked, with Barack Obama’s projected probability of winning the Electoral College increasing by about 25 percent in a period of just 48 hours.

We’re not seeing anything quite that dramatic in the polls right now. Nevertheless, the polling movement that we have seen over the past three days represents the most substantial shift that we’ve seen in the race all year, with the polls moving toward Mr. Obama since his convention.

How far will Mr. Obama’s numbers rise, and how long will his bounce last? We don’t know that, of course. But the range of possible outcomes reads pretty favorably for him.

As I wrote on Saturday night, Mr. **Obama’s polls could easily cool off quickly.** If we return to the equilibrium where Mr. Obama is about two points ahead in the polls — about where they were for months on end heading into the conventions — then Mitt Romney’s position won’t be too badly damaged. Still, Mr. Romney will be the underdog, and he’ll have had two or three weeks of time run off the clock.

### 1NR—2AC 5

**Undecided voters are irrelevant now—too small**

**Marlantes 9/14/12—Csm Correspondent** [Liz Marlantes, Swing state polls: Is Mitt Romney running out of time?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Wire/2012/0914/Swing-state-polls-Is-Mitt-Romney-running-out-of-time]

According to the NBC/WSJ/Marist polls, the number of undecided voters in the swing states at this point is downright tiny. In Ohio, for example, just 6 percent were undecided—which means that if Romney were to wind up winning every one of those undecided voters, he would still fall short.

And as MSNBC’s First Read points out, a lot of those undecided voters probably aren’t going to bother casting ballots in the end. They write: “These are voters who simply aren’t paying attention…. they seem disengaged from the campaign, and they don’t call themselves enthusiastic about the election. They are probably NOT voters.”

In other words, we’ve now reached the point in the campaign when opinions have become fairly set. Most people who are actually going to vote already know who they’re voting for—and barring some big, unexpected event, they’re not going to change their minds.

Adding to the cake-is-baked dynamic is the fact that early voting is actually about to begin in many swing states. In Ohio, for example, early voting begins Oct. 2—and roughly a quarter of the NBC/WSJ/Marist poll respondents in Ohio said they planned to vote before Election Day. In North Carolina, absentee ballots are already available, and they will become available next week in Virginia and Wisconsin.

**Greens hate the plan.**

**NewsOK 9/30/**2012 [Administration policy hampers U.S. markets for liquified natural gas

The Oklahoman Editorial : http://newsok.com/administration-policy-hampers-u.s.-markets-for-liquified-natural-gas/article/3705223#ixzz27K1z8v7Khttp://newsok.com/administration-policy-hampers-u.s.-markets-for-liquified-natural-gas/article/3705223]

Yet **environmentalists fight attempts to establish coastal facilities for LNG exporting. This is part of an anti-fossil fuel campaign that flies in the face of logic**. To prevent increased use of a relatively clean, abundant fuel is to increase the market share for less-clean sources such as coal and oil.

**The environmentalists were for natural gas until they were against it.** At least their cards are now on the table: They don't like any fossil fuels and will do everything possible to make their point.

For Oklahoma, increasing the market for natural gas and its derivatives is a winner. Transporting Oklahoma gas to other parts of the world would benefit state energy firms and state revenues.

“Jobs are sitting around ready to go in natural gas,” Lankford, R-Oklahoma City, said in a news release last week. “All we lack is federal predictability.”

**Unfortunately, the** Obama **administration is all too predictable when it comes to its energy policy. If it isn't green, the administration isn't keen**.

**Industry hates the plan.**

**Fuel Fix 4/16** [http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/04/16/environmentalists-challenge-natural-gas-export-plans/]

**The plans are opposed not just by environmentalists, such as the Sierra Club, but also some chemical manufacturers that use natural gas as a building block to create other products and worry about a resulting price climb. Congressional Democrats have proposed legislation that would ban new LNG exports**.

**More nasty evidence about their AFF.**

Deon **Daugherty**, 9-18-12 covers energy and law for the Houston Business Journal http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/blog/drilling-down/2012/09/obamas-delay-leaves-lng-exports-on.html?page=all

I caught up to one of my sources for natural gas intelligence, Waterborne Energy Inc. analyst Lafayette Herring, for some perspective.

He explained that the **export issue is a political football**, especially during an election season. The kicker, though, is that it's anyone’s guess which side would support which end of the issue, he said.

“We don’t even have a guess,” he said. “Perhaps (one would assume) a Republican administration would favor exports, but at the same time, there some pretty entrenched American industries (that are typical Republican supporters) that are against it. It’s really so polarizing potentially.”

By putting it off, the current administration is choosing not to have this as part of the current debate.

“If the president wins re-election, he will deal with this in his second term. It won’t be an election debate, but it will still a political debate,” he said.

Herring said **the report likely is delayed specifically to keep it from becoming an election issue**, even though it’s not clear which side of the political divide would support or oppose exports.

“This isn’t looking like any normal energy discussion,” he said.

**Media will only focus on the negative**

**Grunwald 8/14/12**—Senior Nat'l Correspondent for Time [Michael Grunwald, http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/interrogation/2012/08/the\_new\_new\_deal\_a\_book\_argues\_that\_president\_obama\_s\_stimulus\_has\_been\_an\_astonishing\_success.2.html

That said, the national media should have tried to look past that, but it didn’t, because the national media sucks at covering public policy. The stimulus included $27 billion to computerize our pen-and-paper health care system, which should reduce redundant tests, dangerous drug interactions, and fatalities caused by doctors with chicken-scratch handwriting. It doubled our renewable power generation; it increased solar installations over 600 percent; it essentially launched our transition to a low-carbon economy. It provided a new model for government spending—with unprecedented transparency, unprecedented scrutiny, and unprecedented competition for the cash. Experts predicted that as much as 5 percent of it would be lost to fraud, but so far, investigators have documented less than $10 million in losses, about 0.001 percent. Despite all the controversy over the lack of shovel-ready projects, the Obama administration has met every spending deadline, and it’s kept costs so far under budget that it’s been able to finance over 3,000 additional projects with the savings. But the media coverage of the stimulus was almost exclusively gotcha stuff, usually without a real gotcha. And when the media did notice long-term investments in the stimulus, like Race to the Top or clean-energy research, it rarely mentioned the stimulus connection.

Except, of course, when it was noticing Solyndra. After a year of screaming headlines about crony capitalism and shady deals, even Republican investigators have admitted there’s no evidence of any political interference or other wrongdoing. A slew of independent reviews—including one led by John McCain’s finance chairman—have concluded that the clean-energy loan program is working well. Everyone knew that some of its loans would go bad. But the Solyndra scandal—which isn’t even a scandal—is probably the best-known product of the stimulus.

**Internal link.**

**Schnur 4/9/12**—director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California [Dan Schnur, The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/]

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

Even in deep-blue California, where Obama wins hypothetical general election match ups against the Republican candidates by margins approaching voice vote, this is an issue that points to potential difficulties for the president’s re-election campaign. Californians who swooned for Obama in 2008, and who seem poised for a re-swoon this fall, told a recent USC Dornsife/LA Times statewide poll that they were dissatisfied with the president’s handling of the issue of the cost of gasoline by a 29-62 margin. California’s unemployment rate remains around 11 percent, but the state’s residents still give Obama positive marks on his work on job creation, the economy and taxes. They approve of his work on health care and by even larger margins on women’s health issues. But highway-dependent West Coasters, even while they advocate for broader use of solar, wind and other alternative energies, don’t like $4 per gallon gasoline and they will like paying $5 per gallon even less.

Obama won’t actually lose California in November, of course. Gas prices would have to hit $10 a gallon for Mitt Romney to win the state this fall. And the same poll shows that voters blame oil companies, rather than either the president or Congress, for those high prices. However, the dissatisfaction that emanates from even a heavily Democratic patch of electoral turf such as California carries much more significant consequences in Ohio, Florida and other swing states. For the time being, Obama is gambling that directing popular anger toward the oil companies — a convenient villain if there ever was one — will allow him to keep the price of gasoline from becoming a roadblock for his campaign.

But if gas prices keep rising and voter unhappiness continues to build, look for the administration to find a way to accelerate the review process that would allow the northern leg of Keystone to move forward more quickly. Obama has been careful not to come out in absolute opposition to the pipeline, but only to call for a more meticulous examination of its possible environmental impact. A more closely competitive election than what is now expected, though, could easily lead the president to decide that his administration’s review has been quite thorough enough and that the time for additional drilling has arrived.

An energy strategy that Obama now refers to as an “all of the above” approach is unlikely to turn into a “drill, baby drill” refrain between now and November. But maintaining a balance between dissatisfied but docile environmentalists on one hand and drivers whose unhappiness stops just short of violence on the other will be a **key** to his re-election. If his poll margins begin to narrow, a somewhat longer pipeline than the one he has already endorsed could become a very tempting insurance policy.

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**No swing states—controlling the issue nationally will pay-off regardless of unique state issues**

**Silver 9—18—12 Elections Guru, Nyt Blogger** [Nate Silver, Sept. 17: Electoral College May Not Help Obama, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/sept-17-electoral-college-may-not-help-obama/]

If you total up the electoral votes from the states where Mr. Obama is currently running better than he is in Ohio, as according to our forecasts, they equal 263 electoral votes — not quite enough for him to win.

To the extent that Mr. Obama has an advantage, it’s that he has a lot of options for how to get those remaining electoral votes, including any one of Virginia, Colorado, Ohio and Florida (although the 263 total includes a couple of states, like Wisconsin and Iowa, where Mr. Obama’s position is not particularly safe).

But what would really signal strength for Mr. Obama is if Ohio were his backup plan. For instance, if he led by four or five points in Colorado right now, rather than two or three, then he’d have a winning map without Ohio, meaning that Ohio would represent almost pure electoral upside for him. But we’re not seeing polls in Colorado, or Virginia, that give him a lead like that on a consistent basis. Right now, Ohio is his “Plan A.”

Still, it would be possible to overrate the importance of this. In the chart below, I’ve listed the probability of each candidate winning the Electoral College conditional upon achieving a particular result in the popular vote, as based on the 25,001 simulations that the model ran on Monday.

For instance, if Mr. Obama won the popular vote by between 0.001 and 0.5 percentage points over Mr. Romney, the simulations find that he’d have a 55 percent chance of winning the Electoral College also. If he won the popular vote by between half a percentage point and one point, he’d win the Electoral College about three-quarters of the time.

Mr. Romney’s numbers are ever-so-slightly stronger in each category. He’d have a 69 percent chance, not 55 percent, of winning the Electoral College if he won the popular vote by less than half a point. And he’d have an 83 percent chance of winning the Electoral College conditional upon winning the popular vote by between half and one percentage point.

Once a candidate’s advantage in the popular vote becomes larger than about a percentage point, however, the odds are strongly against a split between the Electoral College and the popular vote. Mr. Obama won the Electoral College in 88 percent of the simulations that he won the popular vote by between one and one a half percentage points, for instance, and 96 percent of the time that he won it by between one and a half and two percentage points.

And in none of the 25,001 simulations did a candidate win the popular vote by more than three percentage points and lose the Electoral College. If there were the possibility of a distortion that large, we’d have seen it in the swing state polls by now — but instead, they’ve tracked pretty close to the national averages.

And really, that’s about how it should be. Many of the swing states — certainly Ohio, for example — resemble the country in microcosm. Perhaps you can run just slightly better or weaker in one of them because of local economic conditions, or some quirky regional issue — and to the extent that stuff matters, we’ll try to sort it out. But in general, if you’re winning over the sorts of voters who you’ll need to win to take Ohio, you’ll probably be connecting with a winning coalition of voters in most of the other swing states.